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ABSTRACT 
 
REPRESENTATIONS AS A FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS TOOL 
IN SOVIET-TURKISH RELATIONS (1920-1946): A CRITICAL 
CONSTRUCTIVIST APPROACH 
 
 
 
Coş, Kıvanç 
M.A., Department of International Relations 
Supervisor: Pınar Bilgin 
 
 
July 2006 
 
 
 This thesis provides an account of Turkish Foreign Policy towards the Soviet 
Union in the inter-war and post-war eras from a critical constructivist point of view. It is 
argued that the radically different responses given by Turkish Foreign Policy makers to 
the contextually similar demands of the Soviet Union was allowed by the 
(re)construction of the representation of the Soviet Union in Turkish Foreign Policy 
discourse. It is further indicated that the Soviet ‘demands’ throughout the inter-war 
years did not alter the ‘sincere friend’ identity of the Soviet Union, while similar 
‘demands’ in the post-war era entirely changed the identity of the Soviet Union to an 
‘enemy’. Whereas the ‘sincere friend’ identity allowed for maintaining good relations 
 iv
with the Soviet Union, the ‘enemy’ identity allowed the move towards the United States 
as opposed to the Soviet Union. 
 
Keywords: Critical Constructivism, Representations, Identity, Threat, Soviet-
Turkish Relations, Turkish Straits  
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1920-1946 YILLARI ARASINDAKİ TÜRK-SOVYET 
İLİŞKİLERİNİN İNCELENMESİNDE DIŞ POLİTİKA ANALİZ 
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 Bu tez, Türk Dış Politikası’nın 2. Cihan Harbi öncesinde ve sonrasında Sovyetler 
Birliği’ne yaklaşımını eleştirel inşacı bir bakış acısından incelemektedir. Türk Dış 
Politikası’nın karar mercilerinin Sovyetler Birliği’nin benzer taleplerine verdiği köklü 
biçimdeki değişik tepkilerin, Türk Dış Politikası söylemindeki Sovyetler Birliği 
temsilinin (yeniden) inşası sayesinde mümkün kılındığı savunulmaktadır. Buna ek 
olarak, 2. Cihan Harbi öncesindeki Sovyet ‘taleplerinin’ Türk Dış Politikası 
söylemindeki Sovyetler Birliği’nin ‘samimi dost’ kimliğinde herhangi bir değişikliğe 
neden olmazken, 2. Cihan Harbi sonrasıdaki benzer ‘taleplerin’ Sovyet kimliğinin 
tamamiyle değişip ‘düşman’ olarak inşa edilmesine yol açtığı belirtilmektedir. ‘Samimi 
 vi
dost’ kimliği, ‘taleplere’ rağmen Sovyetler Birliği ile dostane ilişkilerin korunmasını 
mümkün kılarken, 2. Cihan Harbi sonrasında (yeniden) inşa edilen ‘düşman’ kimliği, 
Türk Dış Politikası’nın Sovyetlere karşı Amerika Birleşik Devletleri lehine yön almasını 
mümkün kılmıştır.  
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Eleştirel İnşacı kuram, Temsiller, Kimlik, Tehdit, Türk-Sovyet 
ilişkileri, Boğazlar
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
On 7 June 1945, Vyacheslav Molotov, then-Foreign Minister of the Soviet 
Union, informed Selim Sarper, Turkish Ambassador to Moscow, that certain issues had 
to be agreed upon to maintain the ‘friendly’ relations between Turkey and the Soviet 
Union: (1) the Kars and Ardahan districts had to be retroceded to the Soviet Union; (2) 
Soviet Union should have bases located at the Straits for the joint-defense of the Straits; 
(3) the two countries would have to agree on the revision of the Montreux Convention 
before convening a multilateral conference. For the Turkish foreign policy makers in the 
immediate aftermath of World War II (WWII), Soviet demands of 1945-46 for bases 
positioned at the Turkish Straits and for territorial concessions regarding Northeastern 
Turkey constituted an obvious security threat to Turkish independence and sovereignty. 
It was not only policy makers but also prominent newspapers and analysts of Turkish 
foreign policy who confirmed and reaffirmed this conception of the Soviet demands. It 
was argued that facing a clear and severe security threat to its existence from the Soviet 
Union, Turkey sided with the Western World and its leading ‘protector’, the United 
States, to preserve its survival as an independent state. But did the mere fact of Soviet 
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demands of 1945-46 render inevitable the confrontational relationship between Turkey 
and the Soviet Union that ensued?  
The answer for the policy makers was quite straightforward. These 
‘unjustified’ demands were not only ‘shocking’, but also totally ‘unexpected’ and 
‘unthought-of,’1 according to İsmet İnönü, who was at the time the President of Turkey. 
According to Feridun Cemal Erkin, who was at the time the General Secretary of the 
Turkish Foreign Ministry, the 1945-46 demands demonstrated that the Soviet Union had 
been prisoner to “age old ambitions of the Tsars.”2 Thus, the clear aim of the Soviet 
Union was to control the Straits and Turkey. And, if the Soviets insisted on territorial 
concessions and on pursuing Tsarist policies, the enmity of the nineteenth century would 
be certainly revived, maintained Kâzım Karabekir, an influential member of the 
Parliament.3 Any discussion of the threat was deemed to be fruitless, since “even the 
children know what the national security threat is [: the Soviet Union].” 4 It was also 
stressed that the only reason for the deterioration of Soviet-Turkish relations was the 
change in Soviet foreign policy, most clearly exemplified by the 1945-46 demands. On 
the other hand, Turkish foreign policy, which was broadly defined by Şükrü Saracoğlu 
as protecting Turkey’s independence and sovereignty5, was represented as the same as 
in the past.  
                                                 
1 Nazmi Kal, İsmet İnönü: Televizyonda Anlattıklarım (Ankara: Bilgi, 1993), 79. 
2 Feridun Cemal Erkin, Türk-Sovyet İlişkileri ve Boğazlar Meselesi (Ankara: Başnur Matbaası, 1968), 
254.  
3 Kâzım Karabekir, T.B.M.M. Zabıt Dergisi, 7. Dönem, 20 Aralık 1945, cilt 20 (Ankara: T.B.M.M. 
Basımevi, 1946), 256-259. 
4 T.B.M.M. Zabıt Dergisi, 8. Dönem, 4 Aralık 1946, cilt 3 (Ankara: T.B.M.M. Basımevi, 1947), 16. For 
the entire discussion, see T.B.M.M. Zabıt Dergisi, cilt 3, 13-24.  
5 Mümtaz Faik Fenik, “Dış politikamızda devamlılık,” Ulus, 12 Temmuz 1945. Also see “Boğazlar 
meselesi,” Cumhuriyet, 6 Aralık 1945. 
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Although the 1946-46 demands were represented by the major actors of 
foreign policy making of the time as the indication that the Soviet Union had deviated 
from its friendly policy towards Turkey and gone back to the imperialistic policy of 
Tsarist Russia, the mere fact of the 1945-46 demands cannot be considered as having 
determined the course of Soviet-Turkish relations in the following years. After all, very 
similar demands for the joint defense of the Straits and for territorial concessions were 
put forth by the Soviet Union throughout the period between 1920 and 1939, an era of 
‘sincere friendship’ between Turkey and the Soviet Union. Like the 1945-46 demands, 
those demands were rejected by Turkey, but Soviet-Turkish relations were not allowed 
to deteriorate, and the Soviet Union was not represented as a threat to Turkish 
independence and sovereignty. This contrast between the inter-war and post-war 
character of Turkey’s policy towards the Soviet Union has inspired this thesis. Put as a 
question: How can we understand the difference in representations of the Soviet threat 
in Turkish foreign policy discourse in the inter-war and post-war eras? I address this 
question by analyzing the processes through which the representation of the Soviet 
Union was (re)constructed to enable Turkish foreign policy before and after WWII. 
Although the realist tradition, the most prominent approach to international 
relations (IR) and Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA), have introduced a number crucial 
concepts for the study of foreign policy (such as state interest, power, security and 
threat), their treatment of these concepts cause serious limitations for understanding this 
puzzle. First, realist accounts of foreign policy treat their ‘object of study’, the state, and 
its interests as exogenously given and fixed. Although some limited freedom is given to 
states regarding how national interest should be pursued (balancing or internal increases 
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in power), the interpretation of security, threat, national interest or survival by different 
states at different times is totally discarded.6 Furthermore, the deductive derivation of 
the fundamental concepts of the realist tradition from the anarchy and self-help 
assumptions leads to a conception of those concepts “that is too broad, too general, too 
vague, too all-inclusive to explain state action.”7 Second, realism’s metaphysical portrait 
of states, their interests and foreign policies as pre-given and fixed, dependent on a 
positivist epistemology, which assumes that concepts like national interest, power, threat 
can be ‘realistically’ and ‘objectively’ assessed by the policy makers and analysts both.  
Yet, acting upon ‘reality’ always requires interpretation. When a state is 
faced with a particular situation, it first needs to define what the situation is. Then, the 
national interest of the state with respect to that situation is determined.8 However, 
determining whether or not a particular situation constitutes a threat, and deciding on the 
corresponding national interest is never self-evident. For example, determining that the 
1945-46 demands of the Soviet Union constituted an ‘obvious’ security threat to Turkish 
independence and sovereignty was the result of significant ‘interpretive labor’9 on the 
part of Turkish decision makers. Initially, these demands were differentiated from 
similar demands of the Soviet Union before WWII. Then, the Soviet policy toward 
Turkey was combined with those of Tsarist Russia and Nazi Germany. Presented as 
such the Turkish national interest was represented as resisting the Soviet threat and 
strengthening Turkey’s security by allying with the Western powers, especially the 
United States.  
                                                 
6 Jutta Weldes, Constructing National Interests: The United States and the Cuban Missile Crisis (United 
States of America: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), 278. 
7 Weldes, Constructing National Interests, 6. 
8 Weldes, Constructing National Interests, 7. 
9 Weldes, Constructing National Interests, 8. 
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Students of the realist tradition point to the change in the international 
context between the inter-war and post-war era in order to account for the change in 
Turkish foreign policy. According to the realist alliance theory, the emergence of a bi-
polar system in the post-war period ‘necessitated’ Turkey to ‘bandwagon’ against the 
Soviet Union. However, ‘bandwagoning’ defined by the prominent contributors of 
alliance theory, namely Kenneth Waltz, Stephen M. Walt, and Randell L. Schweller, 
does not fit the Turkish case. Waltz emphasis on ‘power’ fails to explain the excessive 
references given in the Turkish foreign policy discourse to the Soviet ‘threat’. On the 
other hand, Turkish decision to ally with the West falls under the category of 
‘balancing’, not ‘bandwagoning’ in Walt and Schweller’s theories. Realism, with its 
assumption that states respond to threats that are objectively given (and can be 
objectively assessed), cannot account for the difference in Turkey’s foreign policy 
adopted towards similar Soviet demands in different periods. In order to explain this 
difference, the utilization of other analytical tools is necessary. 
In contrast to realism’s ‘static’ and ‘fixed’ conception of states and their 
interests, critical constructivists analyze foreign policy as a discursive social construct. 
Discourses are structures of signification, in which a set of rules and procedures are 
linguistically put into play for the formation of objects, speakers and themes.10 Although 
‘social reality’ is composed of diverse and competing discourses, for the purposes of 
critical scrutiny critical constructivists are inclined to study dominant or hegemonic 
discourse(s). Correspondingly, critical constructivist studies, especially in the study of 
foreign policy, choose to focus predominantly, but not exclusively, on the officials 
                                                 
10 Michael J. Shapiro, “Strategic Discourse/Discursive Strategy: The Representation of ‘Security Policy’ 
in the Video Age,” International Studies Quarterly 34:3 (September 1990): 330. 
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inhabiting the offices of the state, who are directly engaged in the (re)construction of the 
dominant or hegemonic discourse.11 The major aim of this critical endeavor is to 
denaturalize (make strange, problematize, defamiliarize) existing structures of ‘reality’ 
and ‘knowledge’ by exposing their arbitrariness, and their dependence on power 
relations and interests in order to open up room for change.12 
Dominant discourses populate the world with meaning and linguistic tools 
out of which representations of both the ‘self’ and the ‘other’ are (re)constructed. 
Furthermore, dominant discourses, through representations of the ‘self’ and the ‘other’, 
construct a ‘common sense’ that predefines what the ‘intelligible’ and ‘rational’ courses 
of action and speech are. By labeling certain actions as ‘intelligible’ or ‘rational’ (and 
others as ‘unintelligible’ or ‘irrational’), ‘common sense’ (re)constructed by dominant 
discourse(s) performs an enabler/limiter role for foreign policy.13 Representations of the 
objects populating the world, (re)constructed by dominant discourse(s), are significant 
for the analysis of foreign policy. Foreign policy actors make sense of the world through 
representations.14 By the construction of representations, actors at the same time 
(re)construct the ‘reality’ in which those representations make sense.  
                                                 
11Jutta Weldes and Diana Saco, “Making State Action Possible: The United States and the Discursive 
Construction of ‘The Cuban Problem’, 1960-1994,” Millennium: Journal of International Studies 25:2 
(1996): 377; Mark Laffey and Jutta Weldes, “US Foreign Policy, Public Memory, and Autism: 
Representing September 11 and May 4,” Cambridge Review of International Affairs 17:2 (July 2004): 
359.  
12 Richard K. Ashley and R. B. J. Walker, “Speaking the Language of Exile: Dissident Thought in 
International Studies,” International Studies Quarterly 34:3 (1990): 263; James Der Derian, “Post-Theory: 
The Eternal Return of Ethics in International Relations,” in New Thinking in International Relations 
Theory, eds. Michael W. Doyle and G. John Ikenberry, 54-76 (United States of America: Westview Press, 
1997), 60. 
13 For the enabler/limiter effect of discourse, see Roxanne Lynn Doty, “Aporia: A Critical Exploration of 
the Agent-Structure Problematique in International Relations Theory,” European Journal of International 
Relations 3:3 (1997): 378. 
14 Weldes, “Constructing National Interests,” 280. 
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It was noted above that the realist tradition, although pointing to key 
concepts in the analysis of foreign policy, was limited by the ‘static’ and ‘fixed’ 
understanding of its concepts. Consequently, the realist approach provides limited 
insight into the Turkish case. On the other hand, the discursive analysis of foreign policy 
employed by critical constructivism provides crucial insight for understanding how 
Turkey’s decision to sever relations with the Soviet Union and the ensuing membership 
to NATO was rendered sensible and rational. And how other courses of action such as 
doing nothing, remaining neutral or preserving ‘friendly’ relations with the Soviet Union 
were excluded, respectively, as ‘irrational’, ‘unworkable’ or ‘ridiculous’. Furthermore, 
critical constructivism’s key concepts such as representation, discourse, identity and 
interest provide the students of foreign policy with the analytical tools to understand the 
changes in states’ foreign policies. For example, the (re)construction of the 
representation and identity of the Soviet Union in the post-WWII period by Turkish 
foreign policy makers provides the analyst with the insight to understand the difference 
in Turkey’s reaction to Soviet demands in the inter-war and post-war eras. 
The aim of this thesis is to provide an account of Turkish foreign policy 
towards the Soviet Union in the inter-war and post-war eras from a critical constructivist 
perspective. The study has two more specific aims corresponding to the normative and 
analytical goals of critical constructivism. First, the analytical aim of the study is to 
examine the constitutive relationship between discourse, representations and identities, 
and foreign policy. Second, the normative aim of this study is to open up room for 
change by presenting a critique of the dominant or hegemonic discourses of Turkish 
foreign policy and exposing the constructedness of Turkish foreign policy discourse. 
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In order to achieve these aims, the thesis is presented in three chapters. 
Chapter 1 lays out the theoretical foundations of realism and critical constructivism. It is 
argued that the ‘static’ and ‘fixed’ conceptualization of power and interest in the 
analysis of foreign policy limits the explanatory value of realism for the Turkish case. It 
is further argued that by employing the critical constructivist approach makes up for this 
limitation. The study then moves on to consider two distinct eras of Soviet-Turkish 
relations, namely the interwar and post-WWII eras. Chapter 2 focuses on the 
(re)construction of the Soviet representation in Turkish foreign policy discourse as a 
‘sincere friend’ in the inter-war era. It is argued that Turkish foreign policy makers 
differentiated the representation of the Soviet Union from that of the Russian Empire. This 
in turn, enabled close relations with the Soviet Union. Close relations became possible, via 
the ‘sincere friend’ representation of the Soviet Union, even when demands for the joint 
defense of the Straits were made by the Soviet Union. Chapter 3 argues that the 1945-1946 
‘crisis’ between Turkey and the Soviet Union was not the inevitable product of the ‘Soviet 
demands’ for ‘unacceptable’ concessions. Rather, the 1945-46 demands and the Soviet 
Union were represented as ‘threats’ to Turkish ‘sovereignty’ and ‘independence’. This, in 
turn, became possible through the (re)construction of the Soviet representation as an 
unfriendly power during and in the immediate aftermath of WWII. It is further argued that 
Turkey’s decision to ally with the ‘West’ was not an ‘inescapable’ outcome of the Soviet 
threat, but was made possible by the (re)construction of the representations of the United 
States as the ‘defender’ and the Soviet Union as the ‘greatest enemy’ of world peace and 
freedom. 
  9
 
 
 
CHAPTER 1 
 
 
REALIST AND CRITICAL CONSTRUCTIVIST APPROACHES TO 
FOREIGN POLICY: CONTRIBUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS 
 
 
 
The main objective of Chapter 1 is to build the theoretical background for the thesis by 
pointing to the core arguments of realism and critical constructivism. Chapters 2 and 3 
will focus on the enabling or restricting role of the (re)construction of the Soviet 
representation in Turkish foreign policy discourse from a critical constructivist 
perspective. Realism has so far been the predominant approach to the analysis of 
Turkish Foreign Policy (TFP), as well as the study of international relations (IR).15 
                                                 
15 On the hegemonic place the realist tradition enjoys in International Relations, see K. J. Holsti, 
“Hegemony and Challenge in International Theory,” chap. in The Dividing Discipline: Hegemony and 
Diversity in International Theory 1-14 (Boston: Allen & Unwin: 1985); Robert O. Keohane, “Theory of 
World Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond,” in International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, 
Globalism, eds. Paul Viotti and Mark Kauppi, 153-183 (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1997); Rey Koslowki 
and Friedrich V. Kratochwil, “Understanding Change in International Politics: The Soviet Empire’s 
Demise and the International System,” International Organization 48 (1994): 215-247; John A. Vasquez, 
“The Realist Paradigm and Degenerative versus Progressive Research Programs: An Appraisal of 
Neotraditional Research on Waltz’s Balancing Proposition,” American Political Science Review 91:4 
(December 1997): 899-912; Jeffrey W. Legro and Andrew Moravcsik, “Is Anybody Still a Realist?” 
International Security 24:2 (Fall 1999): 5-55, Martin Hollis and Steve Smith, Explaining and 
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Realism’s contributions to our understanding of TFP will be analyzed together with its 
restrictions. These restrictions, it will be argued, are to a great extent made up by critical 
constructivism. Hence the dual focus of the Chapter.  
In order to make good on this rationale, the presentation of Chapter 1 takes the 
following steps.  Part 1 presents a critical overview of the realist approach to IR and 
Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA). First main tenets of the realist approach to foreign 
policy will be identified, while paying attention to the epistemological and ontological 
assumptions of the realist tradition. Then, the operationalization of key concepts of the 
realist tradition — power and national interest — will be discussed. This part will end 
with a critique of the alliance theories of the leading figures of the realist tradition, such 
as Kenneth Waltz, Stephen M. Walt, and Randell L. Schweller. The analytical power of 
the realist ‘theories’ in accounting for Turkey’s decision to ally with the West after the 
Second World War will be examined to illustrate the contributions and limitations of 
realism in analyzing Turkey’s case. In the second part of Chapter 1, critical 
constructivism and its approach to IR and FPA will be presented. This part of the 
Chapter will identify the divergence between conventional and critical constructivists. 
The theoretical reasons for employing a critical constructivist approach will be put forth. 
Subsequently, the epistemological and ontological stand of critical constructivism will 
be spelled out. Finally, the main arguments of critical constructivism on discourse 
analysis, in relation to FPA, will be presented. 
 
                                                                                                                                               
Understanding International Relations, (Great Britain: Clarendon Press, 1991); David Campbell, Writing 
Security: United States and the Politics of Identity, 2nd edn. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
1998), 4; Stephen M. Walt, “International Relations: One World, Many Theories,” Foreign Policy 110 
(1998): 29-46. 
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1.1. Realism 
 
Realism in IR is a site of contested claims and ontological disputes. It should not be 
understood as a coherent theoretical position.16  The following description of realism 
certainly will leave out some important nuances and it will blur some differences 
between the authors that are lumped together as contributors to the realist tradition. 
Nevertheless, this analysis seeks to capture the basic thrust of the tradition by pointing 
to widely shared epistemological and ontological stances of realists in IR. Similar 
generalizations lumping together realism, neo-realism, and even neo-liberalism are 
made by several IR theorists. Emanuel Adler categorizes realists, neo-realists, and 
neoliberal institutionalists as ‘rationalists’, while labeling postmodernists, 
poststructuralists, critical theorists, and feminists as ‘interpretive’.17 John Gerard Ruggie 
combines neo-realism and neo-liberalism as ‘neo-utilitarianism’.18 Martin Hollis and 
Steve Smith divide the discipline into two main traditions: ‘explaining’ and 
‘understanding’.19 Robert Cox differentiates between ‘problem solving’ and ‘critical’ 
theories.20 Such approaches generate the disadvantages of overgeneralization.21 
                                                 
16 R. B. J. Walker, “Realism, Change, and International Political Theory,” International Studies Quarterly 
31:1 (March 1987): 65-86. Also see Walt, “International Relations: One World, Many Theories.” 
17 Emanuel Adler, “Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics,” European Journal of 
International Relations 3:3 (1997): 319-363. 
18 John Gerard Ruggie, “What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-utilitarianism and the Social 
Constructivist Challenge,” International Organization 52:4 (Autumn 1998): 855-885. 
19 Hollis and Smith, Explaining and Understanding. 
20 Robert Cox, “Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory,” in 
Neorealism and Its Critics, ed. Robert O. Keohane, 204-54 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986). 
21 For a critique of identifying diverse and ‘irreconcilable’ authors within the realist tradition, see Legro 
and Moravcsik, “Is Anybody Still a Realist?”; Kenneth N. Waltz, “Evaluating Theories,” American 
Political Science Review 91:4 (December 1997): 913-917. 
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Realist accounts of foreign policy treat their ‘object of study’, the state, and its 
interests as exogenously given and fixed.22 States are assumed to be rational actors 
interacting in an anarchic, self-help international system, in which material or material 
related capabilities are pivotal.23 The aims of states in foreign policy are deductively 
derived from these assumptions, and especially from the anarchy assumption. States 
‘rationally’ pursue their aims (be it power-maximization, survival, or security) within an 
anarchic environment. Yet, the emergence of anarchy or different implications of 
anarchy on different states at different times is not questioned at all. The logic of self-
help, the absence of a suprastate Leviathan, is assumed to be a fixed, omnipresent 
product of the anarchic nature of international politics.24 
Another significant conclusion derived from the anarchy assumption and its 
‘logical’ deduction, self-help, is that states are sensitive to relative, not absolute gains. 
                                                 
22 Mark Laffey, “Locating identity: performativity, foreign policy and state action,” Review of 
International Studies 26 (2000): 430; Shibley Telhami and Michael Barnett, “Introduction: Identity and 
Foreign Policy in the Middle East,” in Identity and Foreign Policy in the Middle East, eds. Shibley 
Telhami and Michael Barnett, 1-25 (New York: Cornell University Press, 2002), 2l; Marc Lynch, State 
Interests and Public Spheres: The international Politics of Jordan’s Identity (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1999), 9-16. 
23 For the role of the state in analysis, see Keohane, “Theory of World Politics,” 156; Charles L. Glaser, 
“Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help,” International Security 19:3 (Winter 1994/95): 54; 
Joseph M. Grieco, “Realist International Theory and the Study of World Politics,” in New Thinking in 
International Relations Theory, eds. Michael W. Doyle and G. John Ikenberry, 163-201 (United States of 
America: Westview Press, 1997), 164; Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, 
Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979), 94. For the anarchy assumption, see Waltz, Theory of International 
Politics, 88, 105-107, 111-112; Joseph M. Grieco, “Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation,” International 
Organization 42:3 (Summer 1988): 492-499. For an atypical analysis of self-help, anarchy and their 
implications for cooperation, see Glaser, “Realists as Optimists.” For the rationality assumption, see 
Stephen M. Walt, “The Progressive Power of Realism,” American Political Science Review 91:4 
(December 1997): 932; Kenneth N. Waltz, “Reflections on Theory of International Politics: A Response 
to My Critics,” in Noerealism and Its Critics, ed. Robert O. Keohane, 322-345 (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1986), 330-331; Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 113, 118-119; Glaser, “Realists 
as Optimists,” 54; Grieco, “Realist International Theory,” 165; Legro and Moravcsik, “Is Anybody Still a 
Realist?” 12-13. For the prominence of the ‘material’, see Legro and Moravcsik, “Is Anybody Still a 
Realist?” 16-18; Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, fifth 
edition (New York: Knopf, 1978), 5; Waltz, “Theory of International Politics,” 93-99. 
24 The implications of self-help logic will be discussed in relation to the choice of concepts in explaining 
state aims and preferences. On the nature and implications of self-help, see Waltz, Theory of International 
Politics, 105-107, 111-112. 
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This is because increases in the relative position of one state over another may have fatal 
implications for the relatively weakened state. So, foreign policies of states should be 
directed at minimizing relative loss of power or relative gain of power on the 
adversary’s part, which is theoretically every other state.25 Thus, realists ontologically 
define international politics as a field marked with conflict and competition,26 and try to 
‘empirically’ account for the struggle for power and security in an anarchic world 
through the employment of generalizations and simplifications.27  
Realism’s metaphysical portrayal of states and their interests as pre-given 
and fixed depends on a positivist epistemology,28 which holds that: (1) the same kinds of 
analysis used in natural sciences are also applicable to the social world; (2) a strict 
separation between (supposedly theory-neutral) facts and values is required in every 
aspect of theory; (3) a commitment to identifying patterns and regularities, which exist 
apart from the ways employed to identify them, in the social world is the main motive 
behind social theory; (4) empiricism defines what counts as knowledge.29 The strong 
fact/value distinction of the positivist epistemology rests on the assumption that an 
                                                 
25 Jutta Weldes, “Constructing National Interests,” European Journal of International Relations 2:3 (1996): 
278. 
26 See Joseph M. Grieco, “Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation,” International Organization 42:3 
(Summer 1988): 492-499. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 118; Richard K. Ashley, “Political 
Realism and Human Interests,” International Studies Quarterly 25:2 (June 1981): 205; Mervyn Frost, “A 
turn not taken: Ethics in IR at the Millennium,” Review of International Studies 24:5 (special issue, 
December 1998): 123. Also see Martin Hollis, The Philosophy of Social Science (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996), 64. For an atypical analysis of self-help, anarchy and their implications for 
cooperation, see Glaser, “Realists as Optimists.” 
27 Waltz, “Evaluating Theories,” 913. 
28 It should be mentioned that classical realists like Hans Morgenthau and Reinhold Niebuhr have 
employed a more lenient positivist approach. And this lenient approach was the main raison d'être behind 
the so-called Second Debate. See Hollis and Smith, Explaining and Understanding, 28-32. 
29 Steve Smith, “Foreign Policy Is What States Make of It: Social Construction and International Relations 
Theory,” in Foreign Policy in a Constructed World, ed. Vendulka Kubalkova, 38-55 (United States of 
America: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 2001), 42. Also see Frost, “A turn not taken,” 119-132; Steve Smith, 
“Epistemology, Postmodernism and International Relations Theory: A Reply to Osterud,” Journal of 
Peace Research 34:3 (August 1997): 330-336. 
  14
independent and objective reality can be objectively assessed by the analyst.30 Both 
parts of this axiom are evident in realism. On the objectiveness of reality, Hans J. 
Morgenthau maintains that “politics, like society in general, is governed by objective 
laws that have their roots in human nature.”31 Similarly, E. H. Carr writes that “theories 
do not mould the course of events, but are invented to explain them.”32 On the 
objectivity of the analyst, John J. Mearsheimer writes: “[t]he principal aim of social 
science, after all, is to free the analysis of critical social phenomena from the risks of 
personal prejudice and unsupported assertion.”33 Through the objectivity assumption, 
the ‘social reality’ is defined as a priori of the constituents of that ‘reality’. Thus ‘social 
reality’ becomes a natural process of history which is not questioned.  
 
 
1.1.1. Main concepts of the realist tradition — power and national interest 
 
The claims of the realist tradition regarding the policies of states have to be understood 
within the analytical framework established by the above stated core assumptions of the 
realist tradition. The most significant concept employed by the realist tradition is power. 
Yet, the utilization of the concept somewhat varies among realists, mainly between 
classical and structural versions of realism. Morgenthau, while forming the basis of his 
                                                 
30 See Jutta Weldes, Constructing National Interests: The United States and the Cuban Missile Crisis 
(United States of America: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), 279; Frost, “A turn not taken,” 123. 
31 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 4. 
32 E. H. Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International 
Relations (London: Macmillan, 1946), 69. 
33 Stanley Hoffmann, Robert O. Keohane, and John J. Mearsheimer, “Back to the Future, Part II: 
International Relations Theory and Post-Cold War Europe,” International Security 15:2 (Autumn, 1990): 
196. For a splendid critique of the objectivity of the analyst assumption, see Ido Oren, “Is Culture 
Independent of National Security? How America’s National Security Concerns Shaped ‘Political Culture’ 
Research,” European Journal of International Relations 6:4 (2000): 543-573. 
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theory on ‘interest defined in terms of power’, maintained that “the struggle for power is 
universal in time and space and is an undeniable fact of experience.”34 In other words, 
Morgenthau considered the main aim of states as power maximization and international 
politics as power politics. Nevertheless, Morgenthau stressed the need to take into 
account the political and cultural contexts from which foreign policies of particular 
states originate.35 Yet, the argument for a historical analysis should not indicate a 
divergence from the primacy of material factors, since power is still considered as a 
simple quantitative capacity and a zero-sum game.36 
Waltz’s structural realism, which claimed to provide a systemic (thus more 
scientific) and refined version of realism, was a response to behavioralist criticisms of 
classical realists. 37 The focus of structural realism is on the structure, not on particular 
‘units’ in the international system. In contrast to Morgenthau, Waltz argues that “if 
states wished to maximize power, they would join the stronger side, and we would see 
not balances forming, but a world hegemony forged.”38 According to Waltz, states, in 
their quest for ensuring survival and security (not power-maximization) ,39 exhibit 
“certain repeated and enduring patterns” of the tradition of Realpolitik. Waltz argues 
that the most central pattern of the Realpolitik tradition is balance of power, which 
                                                 
34 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 36, a similar formulation is also present on page 10. 
35 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 9. 
36 Paul Hirst, “The Eighty Years’ Crisis, 1919-1999 — Power,” Review of International Studies 24:5 
(special issue, December 1998): 133.  
37 For a condensed account of behavioralism, see Hollis and Smith, Explaining and Understanding, 28-36. 
38 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 127. 
39 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 126; also see 91-92. For a critique of structural realists for the 
neglect of revisionist powers, see Randall L. Schweller, “Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the 
Revisionist State Back In,” International Security 19:1 (Summer 1994): 72-107; for an argument in favor 
of maximization of relative power, see John J. Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International 
Institutions,” International Security 19:3 (Winter 1994/95): 5-49. 
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Waltz considers to be the only distinctive theory of international politics.40 As the name 
of the ‘fundamental theory’ of international politics for Waltz suggests the concept of 
power occupies a central place within the structural version of realism. It is assumed that 
the distribution of power in the system is an independent reality that can be objectively 
assessed by the units in the system.41 This assumption rests on the fungibility of power, 
in which material factors (mostly military power) play a pivotal role.42 Furthermore, 
structural realism does not take into account the context in which the distribution of 
power is assessed by a particular state, which played a key role in classical realism.43 
Another central concept employed by the realist tradition, especially in 
explaining state action, is that of ‘national interest.’ In an anarchic international 
environment marked by ‘competition’ and ‘conflict’, maintain the realists, the national 
interest of any given state is to ensure its survival and security against encroachments by 
other states.44 Accordingly, ‘good foreign policy’ for a state is fulfilling the 
requirements of its national interest by ‘rational’ evaluation of the distribution of power 
in the system.45 Yet, when it comes to the question of how ‘good foreign policy’ is 
conducted, we more clearly see the connection between two predominant concepts of 
the realist tradition — power and national interest. States have to be powerful enough to 
successfully pursue their national interests. This is self-evident when Morgenthau 
                                                 
40 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 117. Waltz defines balance of power as the fundamental theory 
of international politics on pages 5, 6, and 9. 
41 See Weldes, “Constructing National Interests,” 279. 
42 For the risks of taking power as fungible, see David A. Baldwin, “Power Analysis and World Politics: 
New Trends versus Old Tendencies,” World Politics 31:2 (January 1979): 161-194; Hirst, “The Eighty 
Years’ Crisis,” 133-136. 
43 While Waltz later accepted that power is not totally fungible, he still maintains that power “is more 
fungible than [many of my critics] allow.” Waltz, “Reflections on Theory of International Politics,” 333. 
44 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 134; Telhami and Barnett, “Introduction,” 16; Weldes, 
Constructing National Interests, 277-279. 
45 Weldes, Constructing National Interests, 278. 
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defines interest in terms of power.46 Yet, the same holds for Waltz’s structural realism, 
since balancing of power decreases the relative power of an adversary, and thus 
increasing one’s own relative power. National interest, depending on a strictly fixed 
conception of power, is also conceived as fixed and uniform for all states by the realist 
tradition. Although states may choose between balancing or internal increases in power 
for pursuing their national interests, the interpretation of security, threat, national 
interest or survival by different states at different times is totally discarded.47 
 
 
1.1.2. Waltz, Walt and Schweller’s alliance theories 
 
The aim of this section is not to give a complete account of balancing behavior literature 
in the realist tradition. Providing such an account goes beyond the limits of this Chapter. 
The section will concentrate on three contributors to the realist balancing theory, namely 
Waltz, Walt, and Schweller, prominent figures in the contemporary realist tradition. 
Their ‘theories’ on balancing constitutes the core of the realist literature on balancing. 
According to the realist logic, a state engages in balancing behavior to 
decrease the detrimental consequences of changes in the distribution of power in the 
international environment. In other words, states balance to guard their pivotal national 
interests, namely: survival and security. As noted above, Waltz maintains that balance of 
power theory is the theory of international politics. Furthermore, Waltz elevates balance 
of power theory – which is, after all, a theory – to the position of law when he writes:  
                                                 
46 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 10. 
47 See Weldes, Constructing National Interests, 278. 
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“For Morgenthau, balances are intended and must be sought by the statesmen who 
produce them. For me, balances are produced whether or not intended.”48 This mainly 
results from Waltz’s argument that while power is a feature of the unit, the distribution 
of power is a systemic characteristic,49 and this characteristic finds its best expression in 
systemic polarity, the number of great powers in the system.50 Yet, this argument 
implicitly depends on the rational assessment of the polar structure of the system by 
states. On the other hand, in direct opposition to balancing, bandwagoning is allying 
with the strongest power in the system.51 
Stephen Walt’s ‘balance of threat’ theory provides another approach to 
alliance behavior.52 Walt incorporates variables like power, geography, offensive 
capabilities, intensions within the more general concept of threat,53 and argues that states 
do not, like Waltz asserts, balance against the strongest state in the system, but against 
the most threatening one, while bandwagoning refers to alignment with the source of 
danger.54 Walt illustrates his point by analyzing East-West relations during the Cold 
                                                 
48 Waltz, “Evaluating Theories,” 914. 
49 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 95-101. 
50 For Waltz’s argument that bipolar systems are more stable than multipolar ones, see Waltz, Theory of 
International Politics, 138, 158-159, 163-176. For Waltz emphasis on the importance of great powers, see 
Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 93. 
51 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 126. 
52 Legro and Moravcsik are rigorously critical of Walt’s ‘balance of threat’ theory, and claim that it has 
serious degenerative consequences for the realist theory, since ‘threat’ is not an ‘objective’ concept like 
‘power’. The inclusion of ‘perceived state interests’ within the assessment of threat makes the variable 
irreconcilable with the realist theory. Legro and Moravcsik, “Is Anybody Still a Realist?” 36-38. 
53 Walt, “The Progressive Power of Realism,” 933. Also see Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances 
(Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987), 21. Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder argue for the 
inclusion of domestic factors, perceptions and ideology in analyzing strategic choices of states. See 
Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder, “Progressive Research on Degenerate Alliances,” American 
Political Science Review 91:4 (December 1997): 919-922. 
54 Walt, The Origins of Alliances, 17, 21-22.  
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War, and shows that if states were really concerned with power, they would not have 
allied so extensively with the United States to form an overwhelming coalition.55 
Randall Schweller puts forth an alternative view on alignment behavior by 
claiming, against both Walt and Waltz, that bandwagoning is more common than 
balancing, especially among dissatisfied (revisionist) states in the system.56 Schweller 
argues that the debate on alliances is deeply mistaken in considering bandwagoning as 
in direct opposition to balancing. For Schweller, while balancing is mainly driven by the 
motive of achieving greater security, bandwagoning is driven by the desire of easy 
gains.57 Furthermore, Schweller argues that his bandwagoning argument focused on 
major powers — that is preciously the states likely to balance according to structural 
realist theory’s claims.58 Yet, he seems to agree with Waltz and Walt’s claims that it is 
mostly the weak states that choose to bandwagon.59 
 
 
1.1.3. The explanatory power of alliance theories for the Turkish case 
  
The relevance of the insight of realism and especially structural realism for foreign 
policy analysis is a much contested issue. Various scholars have argued that the 
Western-bias of the realist tradition, combined with the disproportional attention given 
to great powers, prevents realism from providing a full account of the underdeveloped 
                                                 
55 Walt, The Origins of Alliances, 273-281. Also see Stephen M. Walt, “Testing Theories of Alliance 
Formation: The Case of Southwest Asia,” International Organization 42 (Spring 1988): 275-316 for 
Walt’s illustration of his theory in the Middle East and in Southwest Asia since World War 2. 
56 Schweller, “Bandwagoning for Profit,” 72-107. 
57 Schweller, “Bandwagoning for Profit,” 74. 
58 Randall L. Schweller, “New Realist Research on Alliances: Refining, Not Refuting, Waltz’s Balancing 
Proposition,” American Political Science Review 91:4 (December 1997): 928. 
59 Schweller, “Bandwagoning for Profit,” 102. 
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world.60 Waltz accepts that realism’s primary occupation is with great powers, since, 
structures (meaning the polarity in the structure) are defined by these states.61 A brief 
illustration of the relevance of realist alliance theories for Turkey’s decision to guard its 
national interests by allying with the Western alliance and its institutional manifestation 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is helpful for demonstrating realism’s 
contributions and limits. After all, the so-called ‘crisis’ between Turkey and the Soviet 
Union after the Second World War regarding the Turkish Straits and the districts of Kars 
and Ardahan may be understood as a straightforward example of the importance of 
material factors on alliance behavior. For this purpose, first a brief historical background 
on Turkish-Soviet relations in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War will be 
provided. Then, the explanatory power of above presented theories of Waltz, Walt, and 
Schweller will be explored. 
In 1945 the Soviet Union announced its intention to denounce the Treaty of 
Friendship and Non-Aggression of 1925. Vyacheslav Molotov, then-Foreign Minister of 
the Soviet Union, told Selim Sarper, Turkish Ambassador to Moscow, that certain 
alterations were required to adapt the Treaty of Friendship to the post-war international 
environment.62 The major issues of concern for the Soviets were: the revision of the 
eastern border between Turkey and the Soviet Union that is the cessation of Kars and 
                                                 
60 For a discussion on the relevance of realism in the Third World, see Stephanie G. Neuman, 
“International Relations Theory and the Third World: An Oxymoron?” in International Relations Theory 
and the Third World, ed. Stephanie G. Neuman, 1-29 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998); Mohammed 
Ayoob, “Subaltern Realism: International Relations Theory Meets the Third World,” in International 
Relations Theory and the Third World, ed. Stephanie G. Neuman, 31-54 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 
1998); K. J. Holsti, “International Relations Theory and Domestic War in the Third World: The Limits of 
Relevance,” in International Relations Theory and the Third World, ed. Stephanie G. Neuman, 103-132 
(New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998); Barry Buzan, “Conclusions: System versus Units in Theorizing 
about the Third World,” in International Relations Theory and the Third World, ed. Stephanie G. Neuman, 
213-234 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998). 
61 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 93. 
62 Feridun Cemal Erkin, Türk-Sovyet İlişkileri ve Boğazlar Meselesi (Ankara: Başnur Matbaası, 1968), 
246-250. 
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Ardahan to the Soviet Union; the revision of the Montreux Convention; and granting 
bases on the Straits to the Soviet Union for the joint defense of the Straits.63  
In two notes sent to the Soviet Union as replies to Soviet demands, it was 
emphasized that the Turkish government was against any bilateral agreement with the 
Soviet Union for the revision of the Montreux Convention, and any type of joint defense 
of the Straits.64 The Turkish government noted that the Soviet demands posed a threat to 
Turkish ‘independence’ and ‘sovereignty’. Furthermore, it is generally argued in the 
literature on Turkish foreign policy, which is built on realist assumptions, that the Soviet 
threat was the main motivating force behind the decision to ally with the West for 
‘protection’ in an emerging ‘bipolar’ international structure.65 In the immediate 
aftermath of the Second World War, the Soviet ‘threat’ was a basic assumption for the 
decision makers in Western Europe as evidenced in their discourse.66  
According to Waltz, Walt, and Schweller, weak states are likely to 
bandwagon when faced with a threat.67 Turkey is certainly not a great power by the 
realist definition of great powers. It was not even a ‘middle-range’ power in the 
immediate aftermath of the Second World War. Thus, according to the realist alliance 
                                                 
63 Cevat Açıkalın, “Turkey’s International Relations,” International Affairs 23:4 (October 1947): 487. 
64 For the complete text of both the Turkish and the Soviet notes, see Erkin, Türk-Sovyet İlişkileri, 414-
440. 
65 See, for example, Mustafa Aydın, “Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy: Changing Patterns and 
Conjunctures during the Cold War,” Middle Eastern Studies 36:1 (January 2000): 103-109; Duygu 
Bazoğlu Sezer, “Turkey’s Security Policies,” Adelphi Papers (London: The International Institute for 
Strategic Studies), 12-13; Duygu Bazoğlu Sezer, “Turkey’s Grand Strategy Facing a Dilemma,” The 
International Spectator 27:1 (January-March 1992): 19; William Hale, “Turkey and the Cold War: The 
Engagement Phase, 1945-63,” chap. in Turkish Foreign Policy 1774-2000, 109-145 (London: Frank Cass 
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Participation in the Korean War,” Middle Eastern Studies 36:1 (January 2000): 95. 
66 See Michael MccGwire, “Deterrence: The Problem — Not the Solution,” Strategic Studies 9:4 
(December 1986): 26. 
67 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 113; Walt, The Origins of Alliances, 29-31, 263; Schweller, 
“Bandwagoning for Profit,” 102. 
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theory Turkey, a small power,68 should have bandwagoned against the Soviet Union by 
entering into an alliance with the West. Yet, excessive references given to the Soviet 
‘threat’, rather than Soviet power, by the decision makers seem to undermine Waltz’s 
emphasis on power. Then, it may be argued that Turkey bandwagoned threat, not power. 
Walt, on the other hand, defines bandwagoning of threat as giving in to the source of 
threat, which in this case is the Soviet Union.69  Yet, Turkey did not give in to the Soviet 
Union. In contrast, Turkey entered into a military alliance, NATO, aimed against the 
Soviet Union. Thus, the Turkish decision does not fit into Walt’s balance of threat 
theory either.  
Finally, Schweller’s argument that bandwagoning is more common than 
balancing may be more helpful. Schweller argues that while balancing aims the 
achievement of greater security, bandwagoning is done for profit and easy gains. Since, 
for a weak state, balancing is always costly and includes active participation in an 
alliance.70 It is difficult to identify Turkey’s motive in allying with the West as seeking 
profits and easy gains. Turkey’s decision to join NATO, a formal alliance, is considered 
as costly in Schweller’s argumentation. In other words, Turkey balanced against the 
Soviet Union by allying with West. Yet, Turkey did not fit in the ‘great powers’ 
category that are expected to balance rather than bandwagon. Furthermore, it is 
                                                 
68 The effort of the Turkish decision makers to stay out of the Second World War, even though Turkey 
entered into a military alliance with Great Britain and France in 1939, may be understood as an evidence 
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69 Walt, The Origins of Alliances, 17, 21-2. 
70 Schweller, “Bandwagoning for Profit,” 93; Schweller, “New Realist Research on Alliances,” 929. 
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generally argued in the Turkish foreign policy literature that Turkey allied with the West 
for ‘defending’ its national interest from an ‘imminent’ security threat.  
As the thesis will seek to demonstrate, the main reason for this shortcoming 
in accounting for Turkey’s crucial foreign policy decision to ally with the West is 
realism’s static view of national interest. When Turkey’s different response to similar 
Soviet demands on the Straits in 1936 and 1939 are discarded from the picture to present 
a more consistent account, the events of 1945-47 make little sense. An analysis with 
more explanatory power must contemplate on how Turkey’s national interest was 
(re)constructed to make the representation of the Soviet Union as a foe possible.  
 
 
1.2. Critical Constructivism 
 
Constructivism provides the necessary tools to understand the change in the 
representation of the Soviet Union after WWII. Yet, recent attempts of mainstream IR 
theory to include constructivism within the positivist realist tradition necessitate making 
a distinction between ‘critical’ and ‘conventional’ constructivism. Steve Smith argues 
that the radical possibilities promised by constructivism are in ‘danger of being 
hijacked’ by the mainstream to provide auxiliary explanations of what the positivist 
mainstream finds hard to account for.71 Furthermore, a ‘middle ground’ approach, that 
will incorporate positivism with post-positivism, is advocated by several ‘conventional 
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constructivists’.72 Although united in their opposition to critical constructivism, these 
scholars present contradictory claims. Alexander Wendt, Theo Farrell and John Gerard 
Ruggie stress that constructivism differs from realism mainly on ontology, while sharing 
the positivist epistemology.73 On the other hand, one of the most prominent advocates of 
the ‘middle ground’ approach, Emanuel Adler claims that constructivists are 
‘ontological realists’.74 Another crucial claim of ‘conventional constructivists’ is that 
constructivism should be used as a tool for ‘explaining’ the world, not for changing it, 
since for them after the ‘reality’ is constructed it is an object of study that can be 
objectively accessed.75 Yet, when Adler is arguing for moving the research task of 
security studies towards ‘security communities’76 or when Wendt claims that 
constructivism’s aim is to open up room for change,77 they point to the importance of 
the interest in change. However, such an interest is in direct contradiction with positivist 
epistemological claims that Adler and Wendt argue for. Furthermore, the inclusion of 
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77 Wendt, “On constitution and causation in International Relations,” 117; Wendt, “Constructing 
International Politics,” 74. 
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ideational factors and identities as intersubjective beliefs does not fit the positivist 
ontology that predominantly focuses what is directly observable. 
 
 
1.2.1 Epistemological and ontological foundations of critical constructivism 
 
The epistemology of critical constructivism is also a critique of positivist epistemology. 
As noted above, the objectivity assumption is a crucial constituent of the positivist 
epistemology, which the realist tradition adopts. Two implications of this assumption for 
the realist tradition need to be noted before moving on to the discussion on critical 
constructivism’s epistemology. First, by describing ‘social reality’ as a priori, realism 
reifies the existing structures in favor of the dominant ones. When ‘social reality’ is 
portrayed as the natural process of history, “the dominant will always retain an interest 
in realist concepts and claims; and being dominant, they will try, with varying degrees 
of success, to make the world in reflection of those concepts and claims,”78 writes 
Richard K. Ashley. In this very sense, realism is particularly political, since not paying 
attention to how the existing ‘social reality’ came about is in the interest of the 
dominant. The second implication of the objectivity assumption is its firm rejection of 
value judgments. It seems that much has changed since one of the founding figures of 
                                                 
78 Ashley, “Political Realism and Human Interests,” 234. Also see Walker, “Realism, Change, and 
International Political Theory,” 77. 
  26
the tradition, E.H. Carr, wrote: “[w]e return therefore to the conclusion that any sound 
political thought must be based on elements of both utopia and reality.”79 
Critical constructivism shares the epistemology of post-positivist approaches 
to IR, such as critical theory, poststructuralism, postmodernism, feminism.80 
Epistemologically, critical constructivism rejects the possibility of acquiring theory-
neutral and objective ‘reality’ per se, of which ‘knowledge’ is an indispensable 
component. Instead, critical constructivist epistemology focuses on the constructed 
character of the subject matter of IR. This character has two crucial metatheoretical 
implications. First, what we call ‘reality’ is a human construct that reflects and reifies 
relations of power.81 Even the ‘material reality’ is a part of this construction that finds its 
meaning within the intersubjective knowledge system of human beings.82 For example, 
the definition (or representation) of a car strictly depends on the readily available 
intersubjective knowledge system (or discourse). A car is connoted as a beneficial 
                                                 
79 Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 93. For a different and critical interpretation of E. H. Carr, see the 
special issue (volume 24, December 1998) of the Review of International Studies entitled “The Eighty 
Years' Crisis, 1919-1999.” 
80 Although these approaches have essential differences on ontological matters, they have much in 
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Social Theory and International Relations,” International Studies Quarterly 34:3 (September 1990): 270; 
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235-254; Ashley, “Political Realism and Human Interests,” 208-209; Frost, “A turn not taken,” 126. 
81 Jutta Weldes, Mark Laffey, Hugh Gusterson, and Raymond Duvall, “Introduction: Constructing 
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Weldes, Mark Laffey, Hugh Gusterson, and Raymond Duvall (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1999), 9; Richard K. Ashley and R. B. J. Walker, “Reading Dissidence/Writing the Discipline: 
Crisis and the Question of Sovereignty in International Studies,” International Studies Quarterly 34:3 
(1990): 374-76; Jutta Weldes and Diana Saco, “Making State Action Possible: The United States and the 
Discursive Construction of ‘The Cuban Problem’, 1960-1994,” Millennium: Journal of International 
Studies 25:2 (1996): 368.  
82 Jennifer Milliken, “The Study of Discourse in International Relations: A Critique of Research and 
Methods,” European Journal of International Relations 5:2 (1999): 229; James Der Derian, “Post-Theory: 
The Eternal Return of Ethics in International Relations,” in New Thinking in International Relations 
Theory, eds. Michael W. Doyle and G. John Ikenberry, 54-76 (United States of America: Westview Press, 
1997), 58-59, 65; Wendt, “Constructing International Politics,” 78; Weldes and Saco, “Making State 
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device that enables human beings to travel longer distances or as an indicator of a 
person’s status within the prevailing knowledge system. Yet, the same car would be 
represented as a detrimental and even an uncivilized tool, which seriously contributes to 
the degradation of environment, within an environmental oriented discourse. As a reply 
to the standard criticism of relativism, of course the car (or the table, plane, tanks, 
nuclear weapons, soldiers, etc.) exists. However, its representation is made sensible 
through the human construction of meaning. In other words, its existence is “conveyed 
by interpretive and discursive fields as well as perspectival action.”83 There is an 
objective reality outside discourse, but we cannot conceive that reality, since our 
thinking is always dependent on available knowledge systems.84 This does not mean that 
a reference to what we perceive in the world cannot be made. After all, these references 
are made in every study, be it constructivist or realist. Yet, these references do not 
arrange themselves in a single and self-evident explanation.85 This brings us to the 
second metatheoretical implication. 
Human reflection on this intersubjective ‘reality’ (‘knowledge’) is bound to 
be subjective. Thus, “[t]he illusion of objectivism must be replaced with the recognition 
that knowledge is always constituted in reflection of interests.”86 Or as Cox put it in an 
oft-cited phrase “[t]heory is always for someone and for some purpose.”87 This stand 
directly challenges realism, which considers theory and practice to be distinct 
phenomena. Furthermore, it is argued that IR theorists, while reflecting upon the world, 
                                                 
83 Der Derian, “Post-Theory,” 65. 
84 Campbell, Writing Security, 6. 
85 Richard Price and Christian Reus-Smit, “Dangerous Liaisons? Critical International Theory and 
Constructivism,” European Journal of International Relations 4:3 (1998): 273; Smith, “Epistemology, 
Postmodernism and International Relations Theory,” 333. 
86 Ashley, “Political Realism and Human Interests,” 207. 
87 Cox, “Social Forces, States and World Orders,” 207. 
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are also engaged in the construction of ‘reality’, which they reflect upon.88 So 
subjectivity is questioned for both the subjectivity of ‘reality’ and the researcher. Yet, 
this metatheoretical stand is not just directed against realism or other positivist 
approaches. Critical constructivism is reflexive, meaning that it problematizes its own 
claims being aware that they are only impartial reflections.89 Closely related with the 
subjectivity of ‘reality’ and ‘knowledge’, critical constructivism rejects that analysis can 
or should be value-neutral. Furthermore, critical constructivism is motivated by a 
normative aim to denaturalize (make strange, problematize, defamiliarize) existing 
structures of ‘reality’ and ‘knowledge’ by exposing their arbitrariness, and their 
dependence on power relations and interests in order to open up room for change.90 
The realist tradition’s commitment to empiricism is closely connected with 
methodology and ontology. Such a commitment rules out the use of interpretive 
strategies for understanding social phenomena, and it ontologically defines reliable 
knowledge as the knowledge that can be attained through the employment of empirical 
methods. Through such methods, ideational factors, the economic and politico-social 
aspects of social phenomena are either not considered at all, or subordinated to ‘material 
factors’.  
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The realist ontology entirely and intentionally ignores challenges much more 
common in international relations than ‘armed conflict’ like economic collapse, political 
oppression, overpopulation, ethnic rivalry, environmental degradation, disease, 
‘scarcity’ of main elements of life like water, food, shelter and clothing.91 Furthermore, 
realism’s anarchic world marked by self-help, rivalry, and violence helps to reify and 
(re)construct such a world. As Steve Smith maintains, “[c]ertainly if one’s focus is on 
peace, then perhaps a theory that is open to cultural diversity and to the effect of 
language, culture and power on knowledge is to be preferred to a rigid and very time- 
and culture-specific positivism.”92 Ironically, in this sense, the facts are exactly theory-
dependent, since knowledge accumulated is strictly dependent on the ways employed to 
achieve that knowledge. 
On the other hand, the ontology of critical constructivism widens the focus of 
IR to match the complexity of the world. In this attempt, critical constructivism 
(re)introduces the largely neglected ideational and linguistic factors (along with 
‘material’ structures) to the study of IR. Critical constructivism’s ontological focus is on 
the mutually constitutive relationship between the construction of intersubjective 
meaning or discourse, and the identities and interests of agents, predominantly but not 
exclusively states.93 It was said above that the realist tradition takes the interests of 
states (‘survival’ or ‘power maximization’) as exogenously given. Critical 
constructivism argues that understanding the social construction of interests, which are 
                                                 
91 Ken Booth, “Security and Emancipation,” Review of International Studies 17 (1991): 318. 
92 Smith, “Epistemology, Postmodernism and International Relations Theory,” 335. Also see Nicholas 
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mutually connected to identities and discourse(s), is the key to understanding 
international phenomena. Furthermore, the explanations of the social construction of 
interests, identities, and discourse(s) also seek to identify the historicity of interests, 
identities, and discourse(s).  Such an approach not only promises significant insight into 
states and their actions,94 but also makes the inclusion of ethics, socio-economy, gender, 
environment, race, culture and history in IR theory possible.95 
 
 
1.2.2. Critical constructivist accounts of foreign policy 
 
Things in the world do not have meanings independent of actors, but are made 
meaningful through social construction. Critical constructivist works increasingly utilize 
discourse analysis to account for the process through which meaning is constructed. 
Discourses are structures of signification, in which sets of rules and procedures are 
linguistically put into play for the formation of objects, speakers and themes.96 
Dominant discourses populate the world with meaning and linguistic tools out of which 
representations of both the ‘self’ and the ‘other’ are (re)constructed. Furthermore, 
discourses work as enabler or limiter of what can be experienced and/or what the 
                                                 
94 Walker claims that the realist tradition has not treated the state seriously enough, since there is no 
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Political Theory,” 68, 78. 
95 Latha Varadarajan quite appropriately identifies that constructivists while trying to distance themselves 
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experience means and, thus, construct a ‘common sense’ that predefines what is 
‘intelligible’ or what is ‘rational’ to do or to say.97 
Such a definition may seem replacing the all encompassing concept of 
‘structure’ with another one, that of ‘discourse’. However, as Roxanne Lynn Doty 
maintains, “discourses do not mechanically or instrumentally produce practices, nor do 
practices mechanically or instrumentally reproduce a particular discourse.”98 Rather, it is 
through the articulation of representations, whereby identities and interests are 
(re)constructed, that actors, primarily but not exclusively states, make sense of the world 
and act upon it.99 Yet, the ‘play’ of articulating representations is neither innocent nor 
neutral. It involves an interrelationship between power and representational practices.100 
The interrelationship between power and discourse (the ‘politics of representation’) 
directs the students of critical constructivism towards the study of dominant or 
hegemonic discourses. As noted above, the aim of such an endeavor is to denaturalize 
what is taken as ‘common sense’ by “revealing their internal (conceptual and logical) 
contradictions and external (descriptive and interpretive) inadequacies.”101  
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Representations of the objects populating the world are significant in two 
ways. First, it is through representations that actors make sense of the world.102 Second, 
by the construction of representations, actors at the same time (re)construct the ‘reality’ 
in which those representations make sense. Jutta Weldes provides ‘articulation’ and 
‘interpellation’ as analytical tools for understanding the process of the (re)construction 
of representations. According to Weldes, representations themselves are constructed in a 
social process of ‘articulation’, by which meaning is (re)produced out of the available 
cultural resources, and ‘interpellation’, through which “identities or subject-positions are 
created and individuals are hailed into or interpellated by them.”103 Studies employing 
discourse analysis to study foreign policy focus on how representations make certain 
actions possible (Turkey’s decision to ally with NATO), while excluding others as 
‘irrational’ (doing nothing), ‘unworkable’ (remaining neutral) or ridiculous (preserving 
‘friendly’ relations with the Soviet Union). Weldes’ analysis of the Cuban Missile Crisis 
reveals how the masculanist Cold War identity of US was (re)constructed during the 
crisis through attaching meaning to the already present cultural resources in the 
dominant discourse in US (articulation), and through positioning both the self and the 
‘other’ (the Soviet Union) within the articulated meaning (interpellation).104 
The enabling or constraining role of representations mainly stem from the 
mutual relationship between representations, identity and interests. Through the 
(re)construction of representations of both the self and the other, identities are 
(re)constructed and interests are linked to those identities. Adopting a critical 
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constructivist approach allows us to explore the intersubjectively constituted identities 
and interests of states.105 Identities are always (re)constructed in relation to difference.106 
Thus, one dimension of identity is always what one is not. State identities are no 
different. When one state identifies itself as a peace-loving country, the identities of 
other states are at the same time (re)constructed as either peace-loving or peace-
disturbing. The identities (of both the self and the other) constructed by the particular 
state in question enable or constrain relations with other states in line with their ‘given’ 
identities. When a state’s identity is constructed as a peace-loving country, at the same 
time its interests are also constructed. Of course, this example is an oversimplification. 
There are always multiple identities involved.107 Furthermore, these identities and thus, 
interests linked with identities are always in a process of (re)construction.  
A crucial methodological issue concerning the (re)construction of 
representations is regarding the prominent actors involved in the politics of 
representation. It was noted above that for the purposes of critical scrutiny, critical 
constructivists are inclined to study dominant or hegemonic discourse(s). 
Correspondingly, critical constructivist studies choose to focus on the actors engaged in 
the politics of representation who are predominantly, but not exclusively, the officials 
inhabiting the offices of the state.108 After the end of the Cold War, it has been argued 
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that the impact of media in politics of representation as a counter-discursive actor has 
been intensified.109 Yet, it should be noted that the counter-discursive impact of the 
media does not always materialize, especially when the issue is defined as a national 
security problem, and when popular mass media may still be employed to promote state 
discourse(s).110 
In contrast to mainstream scholars, discourse analysis is not devoid of any 
method of empirical analysis. Discursive studies seek to account for the (re)construction 
of representations through ‘empirically’ analyzing language practices. At least two 
methods utilized by discourse analysts in their studies may be identified ― predicate 
analysis and metaphorical analysis. While predicate analysis focuses on the verbs, 
adverbs and adjectives that are attached to nouns that construct those in a particular way 
in diplomatic documents, theory articles or transcript of interviews, the focus of 
metaphorical analysis is on metaphors.111 Deconstructive (showing how ‘common 
sense’ can be reversed or displaced), juxtapositional (demonstrating the inherently 
political nature of discourse(s), genealogical (involvement of power in dominant 
discourse(s) is illustrated by historical studies of past discursive practices) and 
subjugated knowledge (alternative accounts are explored in detail to render 
problematique the existing ones) methods are employed to demonstrate the internal 
contradictions and external inadequacies of dominant discourses.112  
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1.3. Conclusion 
 
The main aim of Chapter 1 was to provide the theoretical background for the thesis. For 
this purpose, initially the main tenets of the realist tradition were presented. Then, the 
core arguments of the realist tradition in accounting for foreign policy were 
operationalized to present an illustration of Turkey’s foreign policy towards the Soviet 
Union. The static conception of power and national interest employed by the realist 
tradition proved to be inadequate for the Turkish case.  In the second part, the 
cornerstones of critical constructivism were presented. The major areas of concern were 
critical constructivism’s metatheoretical and metaphysical stand, and its utilization of 
concepts like discourse, representation, identity and interest in explaining foreign policy. 
Yet, this part also presented a critique of the realist tradition and its approach of taking 
states and their interests as exogenously given and fixed. In order to point to the 
constructedness of the study of states (furthermore reality itself), critical 
constructivism’s metatheoretical and metaphysical stand was presented. On the other 
hand, to demonstrate the limits of taking state interests as given and fixed, the mutually 
constitutive relationship between discourse, identity and interests was made obvious. 
Chapters 2 and 3 will analyze Turkey’s foreign policy towards the Soviet Union in the 
inter-war (Chapter 2) and post-war (Chapter 3) eras, which is the illustration of the 
limits of the realist tradition and the promises of critical constructivism. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
 
SOVIET-TURKISH RELATIONS IN THE INTER-WAR ERA 
EPISODE ONE: ‘SINCERE’ FRIENDSHIP AND SOVIET 
‘DEMANDS’ FOR JOINT DEFENSE OF THE STRAITS 
 
 
 
The main objective of Chapter 2 is to illustrate how the Soviet Union was represented 
by the Turkish foreign policy makers with a distant identity from the Russian Empire 
starting with the War of Independence. It will be argued that this different identity was 
coupled with a ‘sincere’ friend representation of the Soviet Union in the Turkish foreign 
policy discourse. This, in turn enabled the Soviet calls for ‘joint defense’ of the Straits to 
be represented not as a threat to Turkey’s security, but as mere ‘demands’. The first part 
of the Chapter will focus on the initiation of Soviet113-Turkish relations between 1919 
and 1923, and the discussions on the Straits during the Lausanne Peace Conference. 
This part will point to the difference between the identities of the Russian Empire and 
                                                 
113 The Bolshevik government in Russia was called Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic until the 
constitution of the Soviet Union in 30 December 1922. 
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the Soviet Union as represented in the discourses of Turkish foreign policy makers. 
Then, the Chapter will show how the (re)construction of the Soviet Union’s identity 
enabled the initiation of the Soviet-Turkish relations. Subsequently, the material aid 
supplied by the Soviet Union to the independence movement, and the role of this in the 
War of Independence will be looked at. This part will conclude with the discussions on 
the Straits at the Lausanne Peace Conference. 
The second part of the Chapter will explore how the Soviet representation 
was (re)constructed on the memories of the War of Independence. The second part of 
the Chapter, will first examine Soviet-Turkish relations in the 1920s. Afterwards, 
economic cooperation in the 1930s and the intensification of relations will be explored. 
Then, the focus will be on the Montreux Conference and the Soviet ‘demands’ for joint 
defense of the Straits. This part will conclude by looking at the alliance negotiations 
between Turkey and the Soviet Union during 1939. 
 
 
2.1. Soviet-Turkish relations and the Straits during the Turkish War of 
Independence and Lausanne 
 
The Turkish War of Independence and the Bolshevik Revolution gave birth to a new era 
in Soviet-Turkish relations, one characterized by close collaboration. Earlier relations of 
Russia and Turkey are more generally referred to as one of ‘enmity’, although some 
periods of collaboration can be pointed to.114 This ‘enmity’ is represented as having its 
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roots in the thirteen wars between the Russian and Ottoman Empires, which “created a 
bellicose atmosphere of traditional enmity between the two nations.”115 The first sign of 
the change to come was the official renunciation of the secret agreements between the 
Russian Empire and Entente powers concerning İstanbul and the Straits after the 
Bolshevik Revolution. Yet, it is crucial to point out that even before the Bolshevik 
Revolution during the provisional government, Bolsheviks were critical of the other 
elements of the provisional government that argued for the possession of the Straits.116 
Furthermore, P.N. Milyukov, Foreign Minister of the provisional government and one of 
the leading advocates of the necessity to conquer İstanbul and the Straits, had to resign 
from office after the harsh criticisms of the Bolsheviks, who saw the seizure of foreign 
territory as an imperialist motive, and considered some members of the provisional 
government such as Milyukov as imperialist agents.117 
At this point, it is crucial to point to the importance of the Straits for Russia 
so that one can grasp the significance of this change in Russian foreign policy. The 
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Russians view the Straits as “keys to their house,”118 that is, of utmost economic and 
military importance. The Straits is the only seaway through which Southern territories of 
Russia can gain access to the Mediterranean and thus to European markets. In 1919, 
Russia was sending 70 percent of its grain, 88 percent of oil, 93 percent of manganese, 
61 percent of steel, and 54 percent of all Russian exports to world markets through the 
Straits.119 Furthermore, the issue was not only a matter of reaching out to ‘warm waters,’ 
but also one of who will gain access to the Black Sea. The Southern provinces of Russia 
are always vulnerable to military attacks if antagonistic powers gain access through the 
Straits. Thus, the main aim of Russia in the Turko-Russian wars was generally accepted 
as the control of the Straits and thus İstanbul.120 Furthermore, Milyukov states that one 
of the motivating aims of Russia in entering World War I was the acquisition of the 
Straits.121 
Most analyses of Soviet-Turkish relations during the War of Independence 
point to the uneasy situation both the Soviet Union and Turkey were in and 
overemphasize the strategic character of the relations between the two countries.122 The 
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Soviet Union was facing serious constraints after the devastation of the First World War 
and then the Civil War. Its relations with the European powers were severely strained as 
a result of the fear on the part of the European powers that the Russian Revolution 
would spread to their countries. Furthermore, if the hostile entente powers were to 
control Turkey, the newly created Soviet Union, which was already facing grave 
challenges, would be vulnerable to further pressures of the entente powers from its 
southern border. Thus the analysts argue that it was in the interest of Soviet Union to 
construct friendly relations with Turkey and the Kemalist movement.123  
Yet, it is not taken into consideration that when the Bolsheviks were arguing 
for the denunciation of the secret agreements, arguing that the possession of the Straits 
was unnecessary, the Ottoman Empire and Russia were still at war. Furthermore, more 
than a year passed between the peace agreement between the Ottoman Empire and the 
Soviet Union (3 March 1918), and the initiation of the independence movement in 
Turkey (19 May 1919). In other words, the denounciation of the Soviet interests in the 
Straits was not a ‘strategic’ move to guarantee friendly relations with a Kemalist Turkey 
and to insure a friendly Turkish policy regarding Soviet interests in the Straits. Rather, 
Soviet interests were denounced when it was clear that the entente powers, with whom 
the Soviets were experiencing tense relations, were going to control the Straits. This was 
an indication of the reconstruction of Russian interests by the Bolsheviks. The newly 
created Soviet Union was presented as an anti-imperialist attraction center for the 
oppressed countries of the world extends beyond simple strategic concerns. 
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When the independence movement was initiated in Turkey, the leaders were 
well aware of this change in Russia. Ali Fuat Cebesoy notes in his memoir that the 
leaders of the movement “thought of ending the enmity, which was created by the tsars, 
between Turkey and Russia and establishing friendly relations between the two peoples 
when the Bolshevik regime was formed in Russia.”124 Later Şükrü Saracoğlu, who 
served as Foreign Minister between 1938 and 1942, and as Prime Minister between 
1943 and 1946, commented on the initiation of friendly Soviet-Turkish relations by 
noting that these two nations “were able to wipe away centuries-old grudges in one 
step.”125 Such quotes illustrate the differentiation of the Soviet representation from that 
of the Russian Empire. By blaming the tsars of the Russian Empire and/or the Padişahs 
of the Ottoman Empire for the ‘enmity’ between Turkey and Russia, the (re)constructed 
representation of the Soviet Union enabled ‘wiping away’ that enmity. Thus, such a 
representation opened the room for friendly relations with the Soviet Union. 
The ‘strategic’ need to establish friendly relations with the Soviet Union and 
to secure economic and possibly military aid from the Soviet Union stemmed from the 
fact that the Mustafa Kemal’s movement was in war with all the entente powers, namely 
a proxy war with Great Britain, Italy and France, and a tangible one with Greece and 
Armenia. The country was already impoverished by the wars that went on for a decade 
(1912-1922). Finding the resources needed to fight the great powers of the time was a 
demanding task. At the time, the Soviet Union was the only foreign power Turkey could 
turn to for help in order to help its campaign against the entente powers.126 Yet, Mustafa 
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Kemal would be reluctant to ask for aid from the Soviet Union, if the latter did not 
reform the tsars’ policy on the Straits. On the other hand, a Soviet Union aiming the 
occupation of the Straits would not be willing to assist the independence movement in 
Turkey even if both countries had enemies in common. 
 
2.1.1 Initiation of relations between Turkey and the Soviet Union and the 1921 
Treaty of Friendship 
 
The unofficial initiation of relations between the Mustafa Kemal’s movement and the 
Soviet Union date back to 1919. In May 1919 Mustafa Kemal met with Colonel Semen 
Mihailovich Budienni, who offered Soviet economic and military aid to Turkey.127 Yet, 
Budienni made it clear that the Soviet Union expected Mustafa Kemal’s movement to 
turn into a communist revolution. In order not to alienate the Soviets, Mustafa Kemal’s 
answer was that the movement aimed at forming ‘state socialism’, which would 
resemble the Soviet system.128 At this stage, Mustafa Kemal is argued to be using 
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socialist rhetoric and emphasizing the common anti-imperialist stance of both countries 
to ensure Soviet support.129  
The Soviets, at this time, were not enthusiastic about giving material support 
to movements that were not openly communist. However, a crucial change occurred on 
the part of the Soviets in the summer of 1920. V. I. Lenin put forward his thesis on 
national movements during the Second Congress of the Comintern, and argued that 
national movements were progressive and worthy of communist support.130 Luckily for 
the Turkish movement, this change took place before the Foreign Minister Bekir Sami, 
who left Ankara in 11 May 1920, could reach Moscow in 29 July 1920. 
The aim of the Turkish delegation was to secure a military pact with the 
Soviet Union to ensure extensive support for the independence movement. The Soviet 
Union, having its own problems with the Entente powers, was not willing to go that far, 
but offered a friendship agreement.131 Salahi R. Sonyel argues that the Turkish 
delegation was given instructions to inform Soviet authorities that Turkey was ready to 
link its future to the future of the Soviet Union if Turkey’s sovereign rights were 
recognized; and that Turkey was ready to acknowledge the rights of free passage of the 
Black Sea states and was ready to accept the joint defense of the Straits.132 This is not 
noted in most sources. Even if this was not the case, the results of the negotiations were 
crucial for the independence movement in Turkey. According to the agreement draft two 
signatory states were not going to accept any agreement that was forcefully imposed on 
one another; all the agreements between the Ottoman Empire and Russian Empire were 
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to be considered null and void; the Straits regime would be decided in the future in a 
conference held among the Black Sea riparian states.133 Yet, the agreement could not be 
ratified by the signatory states because of the differences regarding Armenia. The 
Soviets argued that Muş, Bitlis and Van should be given to Armenia, but Turkey 
rejected such proposals.134 Thus, the agreement was not to be signed for seven months, 
until 1 May 1921. 
The use of socialist rhetoric by Mustafa Kemal or the ‘concessions’ given to 
the Soviet Union regarding the Straits in the 1921 Treaty of Friendship are considered to 
be ‘strategic’ moves by the independence movement to gain the support of the Soviet 
Union.135 Furthermore, the rejection of the Soviet demands regarding Muş, Bitlis and 
Van are pointed to as the main reason behind the breakdown of negotiations in 1920, 
which is considered to be a sign of the independence movement’s devotion to the 
principles of Misak-ı Milli.136 Yet, such demands, although postponing the conclusion 
of an agreement, did not eliminate the determination to reach an agreement with the 
Soviet Union and the agreement was signed seven months later. Furthermore, both 
before and after the 1921 Treaty of Friendship was signed, Mustafa Kemal praised the 
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relations between Turkey and the Soviet Union in several speeches as ‘most friendly’.137 
When Mustafa Kemal was asked if the Soviet occupied Armenia was posing a threat to 
Turkey in the Assembly on 3 January 1921, he answered “we want to believe in the 
sincerity of the Bolshevik Russian government towards us. This belief is not the product 
of our imagination, our perception or our deception by pleasant words.”138 The date of 
the speech is after the breakdown of the negotiations in 1920 and before the signing of 
the 1921 Treaty of Friendship. In another speech on 19 September 1921 Mustafa Kemal 
explains the reason of friendly relations between Turkey and the Soviet Union with the 
following words: “Russia recognized our sovereignty before any other. And respected 
that sovereignty.”139 
Such speeches strengthened the differentiation in the representation of the 
Soviet Union from that of the Russian Empire. Moreover, they helped to (re)construct 
the Soviet representation as a ‘sincere’ and ‘devoted’ friend of Turkey. It was through 
such a representation that the demands on the northern territories of Turkey were 
constructed as ‘difference’ in views, and not as efforts directed against Turkey’s 
sovereignty. It was again this representation that enabled the trust needed to leave the 
future of the Straits to a conference between Turkey and the Soviet Union. The 
‘strategic’ attempts to secure Soviet help would have been unimaginable if the 
representation of Soviet Union was not (re)constructed as a ‘sincere’ friend, since the 
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traditional enemy representation of Russia would not have enabled turning to Soviet 
help.140  
 
 
2.1.2. Soviet Union’s material support for the independence movement 
 
Although detailed accounts of Soviet material help to the independence movement are 
not available, most of the sources agree that the Soviets provided 10 million gold 
roubles and enough military supplies to equip three Turkish divisions.141 Besides the 
1921 Treaty of Friendship, Ukrainian Commander-in-chief Mikhail Vasilyevich 
Frunze’s visit to Ankara was also crucial in materializing the Soviet aid. During the 
meetings between Frunze and Mustafa Kemal, problems between Turkey and the Soviet 
Union were discussed and resolved.142 Mustafa Kemal, speaking at the reception given 
by the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs in honor of Frunze, stressed the good 
neighborly relations between the peoples of Turkey and Soviet Union, and praised 
Soviet support by emphasizing that “the Soviet Russian Government has been trying, by 
all means and on every occasion, to affirm its ‘sincere’ attitude to us.”143 Years later, 
Mustafa Kemal underlined the importance of the Soviet aid by noting that the War of 
Independence “would have cost incomparably more resources, and perhaps would even 
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not be won,” had the Soviet Union not helped Turkey.144 The material aid of the Soviet 
Union was represented as the ‘affirmation of its sincerity’ and thus the Soviet Union was 
(re)constructed as a true friend that tried to show its sincerity ‘by all means and on every 
occasion’. Hence Mustafa Kemal’s declaration on 1 March 1922 that friendly relations 
with the Soviet Union constituted the ‘crux of Turkish foreign policy’.145 
 
 
2.1.3. The Straits and the Lausanne Peace Conference 
 
The independence of the Republic of Turkey was recognized as a result of the Lausanne 
Peace Conference by the Treaty of Lausanne signed on 24 July 1923. The treaty 
resolved most of the differences between Turkey and the contracting parties. However, 
the Straits was the only crucial topic that concerned Soviet-Turkish relations during the 
Lausanne Peace Conference. The Soviets argued for the closure of the Straits at all times 
to all the warships of every nation (except Turkey) and maintained that Turkey should 
have complete sovereignty over the Straits. The ideal resolution of the issue for Turkey 
was very similar to the Soviet proposal.146 Yet, the Turkish delegation did not consider 
achieving this ideal resolution as a sine qua non for several reasons and at the end they 
accepted the British proposal147 after some modifications for gaining concessions on 
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other topics they considered to be more crucial to Turkish sovereignty.148 The Soviets 
were not at all satisfied with this way of resolving the Straits problem, and criticized the 
Turkish delegation for not having pressed harder for what would have been a more 
beneficial solution for both the Soviet Union and Turkey. Yet this controversy did not 
sever the ‘sincere’ friendship between Turkey and the Soviet Union.149 
 
 
2.2. Soviet-Turkish relations after the War of Independence 
 
Throughout the rest of the 1920s Turkey was mostly involved with internal 
reconstruction of the war-torn country. The major foreign policy objectives during this 
period were resolving the unsolved territorial problems of Mosul with Great Britain and 
of the Sanjak of Alexendtretta with France, and the population exchange problem with 
Greece. These problems necessitated normalizing relations with the West. Nevertheless, 
cordial relations with the Soviet Union remained the cardinal principle of Turkish 
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foreign policy during this period.150 The Soviet Union actively supported Turkey on the 
Mosul problem. Chicherin even remarked during a meeting of the Central Executive 
Committee in October 1924 that “[i]t is absolutely clear that Turkey will not abandon an 
important part of its people because the English capitalists and other capitalists want to 
take petrol from the Mosul.”151 Immediately after the unfavorable decision of the 
League of Nations regarding the Mosul dispute, Turkey signed a treaty of neutrality with 
the Soviet Union on 26 January 1925.152  
At the time the Soviet Union was in favor of a more elaborate treaty that 
would have contained an important clause regarding the ‘peaceful resolution’ of any 
conflict arising from the passage of military ships through the Straits.153 In practice, 
accepting this scheme of bilateral resolution would have meant that Turkey would side 
with the Soviet Union, probably against Britain, if the Soviet Union violated the related 
clauses of the Lausanne Treaty. Although Turkey declined this proposal, Turkish 
foreign policy makers did not represent the Soviet ‘demand’ as an expansionist proposal 
resembling the ‘imperialistic’ policies of the Russian Empire as they would do in the 
late 1940s and 1950s (see Chapter 3). The treaty was signed anyway, and Turkey did not 
seem offended by the Soviet ‘demand’.  Mustafa Kemal again stressed the ‘sincerity’ of 
the relations between Turkey and the Soviet Union in the Assembly, and his statements 
                                                 
150 Güçlü, “The Uneasy Relationship,” 61-62. 
151 Cited in Kapur, Soviet Russia and Asia 1917-1927, 135. Also see Potskhveriya, 1920 ve 1930’lu 
Yıllarda Türk-Sovyet İlişkileri, 192. 
152 According to the clauses of this treaty contracting parties undertook to abstain from any aggression 
against the other. Furthermore, they undertook not to participate in any alliance or agreement whatsoever 
directed against the other. Kapur, Soviet Russia and Asia 1917-1927, 137. 
153 Kapur, Soviet Russia and Asia 1917-1927, 135-136. 
  50
were reported to be ‘continuously applauded’.154 Any possibility of an armed conflict 
between Turkey and the Soviet Union was removed by the signing of the 1925 Treaty.  
It is generally argued that Turkey’s strained relations with the West, at the 
time, necessitated Turkey to lean towards the Soviet Union. However, if the ‘enemy’ 
representation of the Tsarist Russia was maintained such a policy would have been 
impossible to contemplate. It was the (re)construction of the Soviet representation as a 
‘sincere friend’ that enabled friendly relations between Turkey and the Soviet Union. 
Later, relations were further strengthened by the official visit of the Turkish Foreign 
Minister to the Soviet Union in 1926.155 By 1927, when the trade agreement was signed, 
the two countries promised reciprocally to adopt most-favored-nation treatment. 
Consequently, the volume of economic relations between the two countries was 
doubled.156 Moreover, Turkey supported all the proposals of the Soviet Union in the 
disarmament conference and in other international meetings, and praised them for 
upholding peace.157 
 
 
2.2.1 Intensification of Soviet-Turkish relations during the 1930s 
 
The 1930s saw further intensification of relations between Turkey and the Soviet Union. 
After the Great Depression of 1929, Turkey decided to change the course of its 
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economy, and adopt ‘etatist’ economic policy.158 Adaptation of a national economic 
plan constituted the core of this policy, and the Soviet Union was very influential in the 
preparation of this plan.159 Furthermore, the Soviet Union provided nearly a quarter (8 
million dollars) of the forecasted 35 million dollars needed to materialize the plan.160 
The terms of the aid were decided during İsmet İnönü’s visit to Moscow in 1932, and 
were more than favorable. The Soviets did not demand any interest, the aid could be 
paid back in 20 years and Turkey could pay back in terms of goods instead of money.161 
İnönü described the visit in the following words: “we were met with complete 
friendship, we were met with very good friendship, and our visit ended in a reciprocally 
comforting mood.”162  
It was not the intention of the Turkish government to abolish private 
property, as in the Soviet Union, through state planning. Nonetheless, for a nation that 
remembered the devastating consequences of Düyun-u Umumiye the employment of a 
policy resembling the Soviet approach to economy, and getting material help from the 
Soviets to carry out that policy, could not have been possible outside a ‘sincere’ and 
‘devoted’ friend representation of the Soviet Union. Furthermore, Mustafa Kemal’s 
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emphasis on economic independence should not be forgotten.163 As a result, Mustafa 
Kemal could declare in the Assembly during a speech in 1 March 1934 that  
[o]ur cordial relations with the Soviet Union are, as always, strong and 
sincere. Our nation considers this friendship bond, which was constructed 
during our hard times, as an unforgettably precious memory… The two 
states, both with their governments and their nations, have demonstrated 
to the whole world how much they believed and trusted each other at 
every possible occasion.164  
Turkey was very careful not to damage the friendly relations established with 
the Soviet Union. Before joining the League of Nations in 1932, İnönü had told Stalin 
about Turkey’s intention to and its reasons for joining the League.165 Furthermore, when 
joining the League, Turkey put a reservation stating that Turkey would not feel itself 
bound by the Covenant, if the members of the League were to unjustly take any action 
against the Soviet Union.166 In 1934, the Soviet Union also joined the League of 
Nations, and the two countries, which were among the few openly criticizing the 
aggressive actions of Italy and Germany, argued for the strengthening of the League’s 
role against aggressive states threatening world peace.167 
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2.2.2. Montreux Conference and the Soviet ‘demands’ for bases 
 
Fascist Italy’s aggressive policies in the Mediterranean were the main security concern 
of Turkey at the beginning of the 1930s. This concern was the major reason behind 
Turkey’s determination to change the Straits regime. Yet, it should not be forgotten that 
Turkey’s leaders considered the Straits regime of the Lausanne Peace Treaty as a 
‘temporary arrangement’ right from the beginning. İnönü had explicitly expressed 
Turkey’s views on the Straits regime to Chicherin during the Lausanne Conference.168 
Turkey believed that the time for changing the Straits regime had come with the change 
in the international context, and began to argue for the remilitarization of the Straits.169 
Turkey declared its will at several international conferences until the Geneva 
Conference of 1932.170 The Soviet Union, dissatisfied with the Straits regime as much as 
Turkey, supported Turkey’s call for a Straits conference. Yet, Great Britain, fearing such 
a conference would enhance Turkish-Soviet cooperation, rejected Turkey’s demand for 
an international conference.171 
After the 1935 Italian invasion of Abyssinia in 1936, Turkey sent an official 
note to the League of Nations and the signatories of the Lausanne Peace Treaty 
demanding a conference to be convened on the Straits. Turkey’s arguments depended on 
the rebus sic stantibus principle, and emphasized that it was not possible to secure the 
Straits under the existing Straits regime. As before, the Soviet Union was the first 
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country that responded to the Turkish request. The Soviet government declared that 
Turkey’s fear was legitimate and its wish to modify the regime was understandable.172 
According to Duygu Bazoğlu Sezer, the Montreux Conference “came about largely 
because the Soviet Union supported Turkey’s request for an international conference on 
the Straits.”173 Still, the Soviet Union had supported Turkey before, but with little 
success. It was the support of Great Britain, and the international conjuncture174 that 
made the difference this time. Great Britain, seeing that change in the Straits regime was 
now a necessity, decided to support Turkey. The British seemed to have calculated that 
being on friendly terms with Turkey would prevent Turkey from leaning further towards 
the Soviet Union.175 
When the Montreux Conference was convened on 22 June 1936, all the 
participants (the signatory countries of the Lausanne Peace Treaty) agreed on the 
remilitarization of the Straits. The main topics of disagreement concerned the navigation 
of warships through the Straits and the Straits Commission. According to the Turkish 
plan regarding the passage of warships, during peacetime, the fleet size of non-Black 
Sea states passing through the Straits was limited to 14.000 tons, and the total size of the 
fleets of non-Black Sea states in the Black Sea was limited to 28.000 tons and their stay 
duration to 15 days. On the other hand, Black Sea states were allowed to send up to 
25.000 tons of warships through the Straits at a time. In the event of war where Turkey 
was a belligerent or when Turkey perceived a threat of war, Ankara could restrict the 
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passage of warships as it saw fit. In the event of war, where Turkey was neutral, the 
same restrictions of peacetime would apply. Furthermore, Turkey argued that the Straits 
Commission should be abolished, and that Turkey should monitor the passage through 
the Straits on its own.176 
The Soviet Union argued for complete freedom of passage for the warships 
of Black Sea states during peacetime. In the event of war in which Turkey remained 
neutral, the Soviets argued that the passage of non-riparian belligerent states’ warships 
should be prohibited. Furthermore, the Soviet delegation maintained that passage 
towards the Black Sea should be totally prohibited for warships if one of the Black Sea 
states was at war. On the other hand, the British, taking advantage of the disagreement 
between Turkey and the Soviet Union, argued that the same restrictions for the non-
riparian states’ warships should apply to those of Black Sea states. In addition, they 
were against the abolishment of the Straits Commission.177 The French mainly 
supported the arguments of the Soviet Union. Balkan states supported Turkey. 
Bilateral discussions were carried out to settle the differences between the 
Turkish and Soviet delegations. During these discussions Soviet Foreign Minister 
Maxim Litvinov asked Turkish Foreign Minister Tevfik Rüştü Aras what would Ankara 
think about the potential for ‘collaborating’ with the Soviet Union for the defense of the 
Straits. Aras emphasized that Turkey did not have such an intention.178 ‘Collaboration’ 
is a vague term, but it suggested that the Soviets wanted to have a say in the 
administration of the Straits. Nevertheless, towards the end of the conference, following 
the instructions from Ankara, the Turkish delegation decided to support the Soviet 
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proposal rather than the British. It was communicated to the delegation that the British 
proposal was not only against Turkish interests, but totally against Soviet interests. 
Turkey did not want to antagonize the Soviet Union by supporting the British 
proposal.179 Turkish decision makers decided that Soviet interests should be upheld. We 
do not know whether Ankara was informed of the Soviet ‘demand’ or not. Even if we 
are to assume that Litvinov’s demand for joint defense of the Straits was communicated 
to Ankara, the decision was nevertheless made. This was allowed for by the Ankara 
government’s avoidance of representing Soviet demands as a ‘threat’. This indicates that 
at the time the Soviet ‘demand’ for joint defense was not represented as a ‘threat’ to 
Turkish ‘independence’ and ‘sovereignty’. 
Thus, Britain was left alone and had to accept the final proposal, satisfying 
Soviet demands. This proposal dictated that in peacetime non-riparian states could send 
only light surface vessels through the Straits not exceeding 15.000 tons, and the 
aggregate tonnage of non-riparian states was limited to 30.000 tons and their stay in the 
Black Sea was limited to three weeks. Black Sea states were not restricted by number, 
type or tonnage provided that their warships passed through the Straits one at a time. In 
wartime, if Turkey was a belligerent or if it perceived a threat of war, Turkey was free to 
regulate the passage of warships as it saw fit. But, if Turkey was neutral, only neutral 
states’ warships were allowed navigation through the Straits according to the same 
limitations in times of peace.180 
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2.2.3. The ‘gathering storm’ and 1939 negotiations for alliance 
 
The restrictions of the Montreux Treaty were quite close to the maximum demands of 
the Soviet Union. On the day of the signing of the Treaty, Litvinov made a speech and 
declared that “all who have participated in this conference will depart satisfied, and that 
there will be no malcontents.”181 Litvinov also maintained that the “Conference must 
have seen that the close friendship which has united for the past fifteen years the two 
regenerated countries of Turkey and the Soviet Union is indissoluble, and by no means a 
temporary shift.”182 Izvestia, in an article reviewing the Montreux Treaty, declared to the 
public that the Treaty was a total success for the Soviet Union and for Turkey, which got 
back its sovereign rights on the Straits.183 The reactions on the Turkish side were not 
different. İnönü, in his speech evaluating the Montreux Conference, stressed that, 
besides satisfying its own interests, Turkey was very pleased to see that every 
contracting party was also satisfied. Moreover, “our friend, the Soviet Union, which had 
not signed the 1923 Lausanne Treaty, signed the Montreux Convention. It gives me 
great pleasure to state this.”184  
In spite of these positive representations, within the same year of the signing 
of Montreux, Litvinov again proposed to Aras a pact for the joint defense of the 
Straits.185 Aras, again, declined the offer and emphasized that such a pact would be 
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against Turkey’s understanding of sovereignty. Cevat Açıkalın,186 later represented that 
Turkey did not welcome “this unexpected testimonial of friendship and interest in the 
defense of the Dardanelles.”187 The Turkish authorities explained to their ‘sincere 
friends’ the reasons why they declined this offer. This explanation was not satisfactory 
for the Soviet Union and in 1947, Açıkalın, who was one of the prominant actors in 
designing post-war Turkish foreign policy, maintained that Turkey’s friendly relations 
with the Soviet Union continued as before this interlude, but “to a close observer, there 
was evident a slight touch of bitterness on the part of our friends.”188  
Neglecting the Soviet ‘demands’, Aras paid a visit to Moscow in 1937, and 
emphasized the common interest in maintaining the excellent relations between the two 
countries.189 Similarly, İnönü emphasized in the Assembly after Aras’ visit to Moscow 
that cordial relations between Turkey and the Soviet Union would remain as the 
fundamental constituent of Turkish foreign policy.190 Within the ‘sincere’ friend 
representation of the Soviet Union, which was (re)constructed again throughout the 
1920s and 1930s, these demands themselves were represented as contrary to Turkish 
national interests. Yet, the Soviet Union itself was not considered as a threat to Turkey. 
Thus, even after a call for joint defense, Turkish officials could visit Moscow and praise 
the excellent relations between Turkey and the Soviet Union. 
By 1938, the German-Italian threat was becoming more and more clear, and 
Turkey felt the need for alliances in order to counter that Treaty. Turkey’s relations with 
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Great Britain had substantially improved after the Montreux Conference, and Turkey 
started to negotiate an alliance treaty with Great Britain and France. The Soviet Union 
was informed about Turkey’s negotiations. Moscow did not oppose these negotiations. 
After all, Soviet Union was also negotiating with the British and French for an alliance. 
Still, the Soviet Union was increasingly growing suspicious of the intentions of France 
and especially Britain.191 Litvinov had always argued for the ‘indivisibility of peace’ in 
the League of Nations after the Soviet Union joined the League. However, the British 
followed an appeasement policy against the aggressive actions of Italy and Germany. By 
that time, the Soviet Union had started to believe that Germany was intentionally being 
driven towards the East by the French and the British to destroy communism in the 
Soviet Union.192 This belief was one of the most crucial reasons of the breakdown of the 
negotiations between the Soviet Union, and the British and the French for an alliance.  
At the same time, Turkish and Soviet Foreign Ministries were exchanging 
notes for forming an alliance between the two countries. Turkish Foreign Ministry 
hoped that such an alliance could be integrated to the Tripartite Alliance between 
Turkey, France, and Britain, as a joint front against the German-Italian coalition.193 Yet, 
the suspicions of the Soviet Union led it to conclude the non-aggression pact with 
Germany. Nonetheless, the invitation made to the Turkish Foreign Minister, Şükrü 
Saracoğlu, for negotiating a treaty between Turkey and the Soviet Union was repeated, 
and Saracoğlu decided to go to Moscow. By that time however, the Soviets had 
promised Germany that they would use their influence on Turkey to guarantee its 
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neutrality.194 Furthermore, it is argued that the first aim of the Soviet Union was to avoid 
getting involved in the war that was clearly approaching.195 
With these purposes in mind, the Soviet Union made several demands on the 
Turkish delegation. Three of these demands were of utmost significance. The Soviets 
wanted:  (1) to sign a pact of joint defense of the Straits; (2) a guarantee that warships of 
non-Black Sea powers would not be allowed right of passage through the Straits; (3) and 
to put a reservation in favor of Germany, providing that the Soviet Union would only 
honor the terms of the treaty if they would not result in a conflict between the Soviet 
Union and Germany.196 Saracoğlu declined the Soviet demands. After all, one of the 
main objectives of Turkey in signing a treaty with the Soviet Union was to secure Soviet 
help against Germany. The German reservation proposed by the Soviets eliminated the 
possibility of achieving that objective. Furthermore, Turkey concluded that the demands 
for joint defense of the Straits were against its interests. Still, Erkin, who was a member 
of the Turkish delegation during the 1939 negotiations, maintained publicly that the 
negotiations ended within a friendly atmosphere. The joint declaration also emphasized 
that friendly relations and the preservation of peace were the main tenets of the foreign 
policies of both countries.197 İnönü noted similar points during his speech at the 
Assembly regarding the negotiations:  
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The special conditions and the limitations set by the circumstances of our 
time should not affect the friendship between the two countries. In the 
future, as it was in the past, we shall follow the natural course of a policy 
of friendship with the Soviets.198  
 
Most of the analysts referring to the Soviet-Turkish negotiations of 1939 
argue that the negotiations damaged the relations between the two countries.199 
However, the words used to explain this damage at the time lack the severity of those 
used after the Second World War. The impact of the 1939 negotiations are described as 
‘the breakdown of Soviet-Turkish closeness,’200 or as ‘hard knocks’201 to the relations of 
the two countries, or as ‘overshadowing,’202 or as the ‘separation of the paths’ of the two 
countries.203 The relatively milder tone of these descriptions will be much more 
accurately identified after the next Chapter, which will focus on the representation of 
both the Soviet Union and its demands in the post-war era. 
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2.3. Conclusion 
 
The major objective of Chapter 2 was to show how the Soviet Union was interpellated 
by Turkish foreign policy makers with a different identity than the Russian Empire 
during the 1920s and 1930s, and how this different identity enabled the construction of 
the representation of the Soviet Union as a ‘sincere friend’ by Turkish foreign policy 
makers. Within this representation certain demands of the Soviet Union from Turkey 
were generally presented as mere differences in the respective outlooks of Turkey and 
the Soviet Union. But the Soviet Union was never presented as a ‘threat’ to Turkey. The 
Turkish leaders always emphasized the ‘sincere’ friendship between Turkey and the 
Soviet Union. As argued above, throughout the 1920s and 1930s, during crucial 
negotiations between Turkey and the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union, numerous times, 
asked for the joint defense or the joint regulation of the Straits. All of these demands 
were rejected by Turkey (except the demand made in 1920 to decide the future of the 
Straits in a conference between Black Sea states). But the Soviet Union was never 
represented as ‘expansionist’, ‘imperialist’ as in the post-war era (see Chapter 3). On the 
contrary, during the inter-war era the ‘sincere’ friend representation of the Soviet Union 
enabled the strengthening of Soviet-Turkish relations. Chapter 3 will focus on how this 
representation was (re)constructed into an ‘enemy’ representation of the Soviet Union. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
 
SOVIET-TURKISH RELATIONS DURING THE POST-WAR ERA 
EPISODE TWO: ‘STALIN’S DEMANDS’ ON THE STRAITS AND 
THE ‘SOVIET IMPERIALISM’ 
 
 
 
Chapter 2 analyzed how the representation of the Soviet Union was (re)constructed as a 
‘sincere friend’ of Turkey between in the inter-war years. This representation was in 
direct contrast with that of ‘Tsarist Russia’. Furthermore, within the ‘sincere friend’ 
representation of the Soviet Union, a number of Soviet demands concerning the Straits 
and some eastern provinces of Turkey did not result in a crisis between the two 
countries. Chapter 2 seeks to illustrate how the ‘sincere friend’ representation of the 
Soviet Union was (re)constructed during the post-war period into a state that was 
‘threatening’ to Turkish sovereignty and independence. 
The first part of the Chapter will focus on Soviet-Turkish relations during 
WWII in an attempt to demonstrate how mutual trust eroded throughout WWII. The 
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second part will look at the Soviet demands for bases and territorial concessions in 
1945. This part will point to the ways through which Soviet demands, which were 
similar in content to those of inter-war years, were differentiated by the Turkish foreign 
policy makers from those of the inter-war years. Additionally, how the representation of 
the Soviet Union was (re)constructed using the already available resources in the 
Turkish foreign policy discourse will be looked at. The concluding part of the Chapter 
will explore the internationalization of the ‘Straits crisis’ and the Turkish quest for 
Western support. A further aim of this part will be to demonstrate the dichotomy 
between the representations of the United States and the Soviet Union and their 
‘demands’. The literature inspired by traditional approaches represents Turkey’s 
reaction to Soviet ‘demands’ as ‘unavoidable’, thereby failing to explain how similar 
threats were represented and responded to in radically different ways. 
 
 
3.1. The Second World War and Soviet-Turkish relations: the emergence of the 
‘air of suspicion’ and ‘mutual distrust’ 
 
It was mostly during WWII that the representation of the Soviet Union in Turkish 
foreign policy discourse underwent a major (re)construction.204 The possibility of a 
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crisis with the Soviet Union after the war was being considered by the policy makers 
well before the end of WWII. Turkish suspicions were mainly concerning the ‘designs’ 
of the Soviet Union on the Straits supported by a fear of Soviet ‘liberation’ of the 
Balkans. On the other hand, the Soviets were greatly concerned by Turkey’s policies 
during WWII. Most of the Turkish sources underplay the events that created dissent on 
the Soviet side, but these events were significant in the (re)construction of Turkey’s 
representation in the Soviet Union. The aim of this part is to analyze this mutual 
(re)construction, which constitutes the background of the Soviet demands in 1945 and 
Turkey’s response. 
During the initial years of the war, until Germany attacked the Soviet Union, 
Turkey was subject to continuing Soviet pressures for a military base at the Straits. 
These demands, Bruce Robellet Kuniholm has argued, demonstrating ‘Soviet designs’ 
on and ‘ill will’ toward Turkey was the main reason why Turkey did not enter WWII in 
1940 after Italy declared war on the Allies.205 Similarly, it is argued that Soviet demands 
largely shaped Turkish foreign policy between 1939 and 1941.206 Yet, it should not be 
forgotten that the major aim of Turkish foreign policy throughout WWII was to avoid 
being dragged into the war.207 Furthermore, the British saw the Turkish decision to 
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invoke Protocol 2 of the Tripartite Agreement208 as an excuse for not honoring the 
obligations of the Alliance, since the British saw no possibility of an armed conflict 
between Turkey and the Soviet Union if Turkey entered the war.209 Although Protocol 2 
was probably invoked by the Turkish government as an excuse for not entering the 
war210, it could be considered as an indication of the changing attitude towards the 
Soviet Union.  
The Hitler-Molotov talks of November 1940 strengthened Turkish suspicions 
regarding the Soviet ‘designs’.211 During these talks Hitler proposed to replace the 
Montreux Convention with one more favorable to the Soviet Union. More specifically, 
Hitler offered a regime in which the Soviet Union would be able to navigate its warships 
through the Straits at any time and without any restrictions. While all the warships of 
non-Black Sea states (except Germany and Italy) would be denied passage.212 Yet, 
Vyacheslav Molotov did not consider these proposals as satisfactory for Soviet interests. 
Molotov insisted on a guarantee for a (light naval and land forces) base at the Straits.213 
After the Soviet Union was attacked by Germany in the summer of 1941, both the 
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Soviet Union and Britain declared that they were loyal to the Montreux Convention. 
This was intended to alleviate Turkish suspicions of an agreement between Britain and 
the Soviet Union at Turkey’s expense. Nevertheless, the incident only helped the erosion 
of trust between Turkey and the Soviet Union. Soviet criticisms of Turkey’s pro-Axis 
attitude after the Battle of Stalingrad and, later, criticisms of Turkish neutrality were 
regarded as ‘unfair’ by the Turkish authorities, strengthening Turkey’s suspicions of the 
Soviet Union.214 The (re)constructed representation of the Soviet Union (although not as 
an ‘enemy’ yet) was the most important factor of Turkey’s response to ‘Stalin’s 
demands’ after WWII. The next part of the Chapter will focus on the 1945 demands, yet 
before moving on it is essential to discuss some of the crucial events, which led to a 
(re)construction of the representation of Turkey in the Soviet Union. 
 
 
3.1.1. The (re)construction of the representation of Turkey in the Soviet Union into 
a ‘potential source of conflict’ 
 
When the German army entered France in 1940, they got hold of many classified 
documents of the French. One of these documents had a severe impact on Turkey’s 
image in the Soviet Union. According to this document, Rene Massigli, the French 
Ambassador to Turkey, had asked Şükrü Saracoğlu, the then-Prime Minister, for 
Turkey’s permission for French planes to pass through Turkey to bomb strategic oil 
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facilities in Baku in 1940.215 This was intended to cripple the war potential of the Soviet 
Union and Germany, to which the Soviet Union was providing oil. Although Saracoğlu 
did not give official permission for such a plan, he had clearly indicated that Turkey 
would not oppose it.216 After this came out, Turkey’s representation in the Soviet Union 
began to change to a country participating in plans to directly attack the Soviet Union. 
The German offensive against the Soviet Union that began in June 1941 
added to the Soviet resentment against Turkey. This was because the Soviets believed 
that Turkey was ‘emotionally’ supporting the Germans against the Soviet Union.217 The 
remarks made by Saracoğlu during a conversation in August 1942 with Franz Von 
Papen, the German Ambassador to Turkey seemed to have created this perception. 
During this conversation Saracoğlu reportedly told Von Papen that “he would very 
much like to see the collapse of the Soviet Union and an opportunity like this one comes 
only once in every thousand years. Yet, as the Prime Minister he must make sure that 
Turkey maintains its neutrality.”218 Lastly, the Soviets were greatly concerned by the 
pan-Turkic (pan-Turanist) activities in Turkey. There was a sizeable Turkic-Islamic 
population within the Soviet Union, and the Communist Party considered these people 
as a permanent threat to Soviet national unity.219  
Throughout the Atatürk era, Turkey was very cautious of Soviet Union’s 
sensitivities on this issue. Still these pan-Turanist elements in Turkey were not acted 
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upon until May 1944 (when it was clear that the Allies were going to win the war). The 
Soviet Union argued that pan-Turanists in Turkey were trying to create dissent among 
the Turkic population of the Soviet Union.220 It is important to note at this point that the 
Turkish government exercised a considerable control over the media during WWII. The 
government had the power to close any newspapers it believed to be endangering 
Turkey’s national security.221 The government’s inactivity regarding this small but 
influential pan-Turanist group, knowing that the Soviet Union will be offended by their 
activities, signifies that the Turkish government was abandoning its cautious policy 
toward the Soviet Union. Furthermore, like the British, the Soviets were also critical of 
Turkey remaining neutral during WWII. Yet at the same time, the Soviet Union was also 
critical of the attempts (especially during the Adana Conference) to bring Turkey to the 
war fearing that these attempts were aimed at limiting Soviet influence in the Balkans.222 
When the war was coming to an end, Turkey’s representation in the Soviet Union was 
more as a ‘potential source of conflict’ than a ‘sincere friend’.223  
 
 
3.1.2. Conferences of the ‘Big Three’: The Soviets begin to ‘reveal their insidious 
nature’ 
 
The question of the Straits was internationally raised for the first time by the Soviet 
leader Joseph Stalin at the Allied conference at Tehran in November 1943. During the 
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conference, Stalin raised the issue of Soviet need for ‘warm water ports’. Winston 
Churchill agreed that some changes have to be made to the Montreux Convention in 
favor of the Soviet Union.224 Later, in October 1944, during Churchill’s visit to 
Moscow, Stalin raised the issue once again and complained about the ‘disproportional’ 
rights of Turkey regarding the Straits. Stalin emphasized that the decision to close the 
Straits should not be only in Turkey’s discretion. Stalin made his stance clear by 
expressing that the Montreux Convention was ‘unacceptable’ and a ‘spearhead’ aimed at 
the Soviet Union.225 Churchill, even more disappointed with Turkey by this stage due to 
Turkey’s reluctance to enter the war, agreed that the Soviet Union had ‘a right and moral 
claim’ for access to warm waters.226 Furthermore, Churchill agreed with Stalin that the 
Convention was ‘inadmissible’ and ‘obsolete’.227 
On the other hand, Anthony Eden, who was the British Foreign Minister at 
the time, was critical of Churchill’s remarks to Stalin regarding the Straits. Eden 
believed that giving a free-hand to the Soviet Union in the Straits would jeopardize 
British interests. Eden’s arguments were influential in the change of Churchill’s views 
regarding the Straits.228 Before the Yalta Conference in February 1945, Eden believed 
that the Soviets would ask for a new regime that would enable their warships to pass 
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through the Straits in time of war. The Americans, on the other hand, hoped that the 
issue would not come up.229 Still, Stalin raised the Straits issue during the Yalta 
Conference. Actually, Stalin generally repeated what he told Churchill in Moscow. The 
Soviet leader criticized Turkey’s right to close the Straits unilaterally not only during 
times of war but also if Turkey decides that there is a threat of war. Stalin also stressed 
that the Convention was ‘outmoded’; and (as a new point) emphasized that the 
Montreux Convention was signed at a time when Soviet-British relations were not 
‘perfect’.230 Stalin maintained at the Yalta Conference, after pointing to Soviet Union’s 
discontent, that “it was impossible to accept a situation in which Turkey had a hand on 
Russia’s throat.”231 In all of the conferences mentioned above, Turkey and its policy 
throughout WWII was repeatedly criticized by Stalin and Molotov. Furthermore, Turkey 
was represented by the leaders of the Soviet Union as a country endangering the security 
of the Soviet Union. This was perhaps the most obvious indication that Turkey’s 
representation in the Soviet Union had severely changed throughout WWII. 
 
 
3.2. Sarper-Molotov talks: the ‘crisis’ begins 
 
Despite the mutually unfavorable atmosphere created throughout WWII, the 
significance of Soviet friendship was still emphasized in Turkish foreign policy 
discourse.  On 23 February 1945, Faik Öztrak (then-president of the Republican 
                                                 
229 Howard, Turkey, the Straits and U.S. Policy, 212. 
230 A. Suat Bilge, Güç Komşuluk: Türkiye-Sovyetler Birliği İlişkileri, 1920-1964 (Ankara: Türkiye İş 
Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 1992), 261. 
231 DeLuca, Great Power Rivalry at the Turkish Straits, 150. 
  72
People’s Party’s Parliamentary Group) maintained that achieving “a good relationship 
with the Soviet Union was one of the main pillars of Turkish foreign policy.”232 
Similarly, M. Ökmen, then-Minister of Justice, emphasized that Soviet-Turkish 
friendship was a fundamental aspect in the creation of the Turkish Republic and had 
remained so for the last twenty-five years.233 The Soviet army and its achievements 
during WWII were also praised by A. R. Tarhan, Saracoğlu and Ökmen in the Turkish 
Parliament.234 During this period, the potential for a clash between Turkey and the 
Soviet Union was publicly dismissed by Turkish policy makers. In an interview Numan 
Menemencioğlu, Foreign Minister, represented the Soviet Union as a ‘sincere friend’ 
and maintained that “centuries-old ambitions of Russians on the Straits were imaginary 
myths.”235 When asked later, İnönü emphasized that he would have considered the 
demands made by the Soviet Union in June 1945 as ‘out of the question’ in March 1945. 
He explained that his plan at the time was signing separate alliances with both the Soviet 
Union and Western powers.236 However, it is clear that Selim Sarper, Turkish 
Ambassador to Moscow, warned as early as December 1944 that the Soviet Union 
would probably denounce the 1925 Treaty and propose some revisions in the Montreux 
Convention. Furthermore, Sarper pointed out that the attitude of his Soviet counterparts 
toward Turkey was far from being friendly.237 In other words, although the 
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representation of the Soviet Union was maintained, publicly, as a ‘sincere friend’, the 
Turkish foreign policy makers were informed of the change in Soviet foreign policy. 
On 19 March 1945, Molotov informed Sarper that the Soviet Union would 
not extend the 1925 Treaty of ‘Friendship and Non-Aggression’. Molotov emphasized 
that the Treaty was 20 years old and that ‘serious improvements’ had to be made in 
order to reflect the conditions of the day.238 When Sarper asked what he meant by 
‘improvements’, Molotov replied that he could not provide specific details. However, he 
stressed that further discussions depended on the will of the Turkish government to draft 
a new treaty.239 The denunciation of the 1925 Treaty by the Soviet Union was an 
expected move. Sarper again informed Ankara that making revisions on the Montreux 
Treaty was what Molotov meant by ‘improvements’.240 Still, Turkish newspapers 
generally responded positively to the denunciation of the 1925 Treaty, and argued that it 
was ‘natural’ for the Soviet Union to ask for improvements in an old treaty in order to 
better serve both Turkish and Soviet interests.241 Furthermore, key columnists argued 
that Soviet-Turkish relations were cordial despite some minor disagreements, while 
accepting that the new international situation called for changes in the Soviet-Turkish 
Treaty of 1925.242  
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After considering Molotov’s remarks, the Turkish government declared its 
wish to discuss a new treaty with the Soviet Union. After the declaration of the Turkish 
government, two ‘unofficial’ conversations were held between Sarper and the Soviet 
Ambassador Sergei Vinogradov during May 1945. The main subject of the 
conversations was the Straits. Vinogradov strongly stressed Soviet Union’s concern for 
the security of the Black Sea in a way to indicate that the new treaty also had to tackle 
this issue. Subsequently, Sarper asked if he meant something like an alliance.243 
Vinogradov took the issue very enthusiastically and answered in the affirmative.244  
During the conversation that followed this crucial dialogue, Sarper hinted 
that Turkey would agree to close the Straits to the warships of non-Black Sea states, 
while allowing the passage of Soviet warships during times of war.245 It was also noted 
by Sarper that in order to share the extra burden caused by such a scheme, the Soviet 
Union would have to assure its ‘support’ when the security of the Straits was severed as 
a result of the obligations Turkey undertook in a possible alliance.246 These 
conversations were considered as promising by the Turkish Foreign Ministry.247 Before 
Sarper returned to Moscow for the negotiation of a new treaty, he was given directions 
by the Turkish Foreign Ministry. These directions clearly emphasized that the issue of 
passage of warships through the Straits could be addressed during the negotiations for 
an alliance in the manner discussed between Sarper and Vinogradov.248  
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Encouraged by the conversations with Vinogradov, Sarper asked for an 
interview with Molotov after his return to Moscow. The meeting took place on 7 June 
1945, during which Molotov informed Sarper that certain issues had to be agreed upon 
before moving on to the negotiations of an alliance: (1) the Kars and Ardahan districts 
had to be retroceded to the Soviet Union;249 (2) Soviet Union should have bases located 
at the Straits for the joint-defense of the Straits;250 (3) the two countries would have to 
agree on the revision of the Montreux Convention before convening a multilateral 
conference. In addition, Molotov referred to a fourth demand, which is believed to be a 
call for the reorientation of Turkish foreign policy, which would have made the other 
demands unnecessary.251 During a second meeting on June 18, Molotov repeated the 
same demands and stressed that without an agreement on these topics, the Soviet Union 
would not resume negotiations for an alliance.  
 
 
3.2.1. ‘Stalin’s demands’ and (re)construction of the representation of the Soviet 
Union 
 
According to sources who witnessed the period, the general impression in the Turkish 
Foreign Ministry at the time was that territorial demands were put forth as a negotiation 
tactic by the Soviet Union in order to achieve a desirable solution to the problem of the 
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Straits.252 The British Foreign Office and American State Department also shared this 
view.253 Although Sarper stressed that the Turks were used to such ‘war of nerves,’ 
Stalin’s demands are often marked as the beginning of the ‘Straits crisis.’254 After 
‘Stalin’s demands’ were announced, major policy makers were ‘shocked’ by the 
content. İnönü maintained that the demands were totally ‘unexpected’ and ‘unthought-
of.’255 Similarly, Cevat Açıkalın, in 1947, described Turkey’s feelings as “it was sad that 
after believing for twenty years in a sincere understanding and friendship with Russia, 
the Turkish people had to witness the most unjustified attacks.”256 The Turkish policy on 
the issue was outlined by then-Foreign Minister, Hasan Saka. Saka maintained that there 
was no question of territorial concessions and that any changes in the Montreux regime 
concerned all of the signatory states of the Montreux Convention and required an 
international conference.257 Prime Minister, Saracoğlu emphasized that there was no 
change in Turkish foreign policy. “As in the past, contemporary Turkish foreign policy 
aims to protect Turkey’s independence and sovereignty.”258 If the Soviet Union honored 
these principles, good relations could be (re)built. 
Then, Turkish foreign policy makers represented, the change in Soviet 
Union’s foreign policy alone as the cause of the deterioration in Soviet-Turkish 
relations. The change in Soviet foreign policy was further represented as a restoration of 
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the imperialist policy of Tsarist Russia. Maybe the most influential person in 
formulating the policy of the Turkish Foreign Ministry on the issue, Feridun Cemal 
Erkin, represented the Soviet Union as being prisoner to “age old ambitions of the 
Tsars.”259 Kâzım Karabekir, who was an Assembly member in 1945 and who also 
served as the commander of the Eastern Army during the War of Independence and was 
one of the crucial actors in the formation of the Soviet-Turkish friendship in 1920, 
underlined in the Parliament that he wished that good relations between Turkey and the 
Soviet Union could be maintained. But he warned, if the Soviets insisted on territorial 
concessions and if the Soviets were insistent on pursuing Tsarist policies, the enmity of 
the nineteenth century would certainly revive.260 
The articles printed in Turkish newspapers were of significance in the 
(re)construction of the Soviet representation throughout the period following the 1945 
demands. The stance of the government was mainly communicated to the public through 
newspapers. This influence also resulted from the lack of public statements by foreign 
policy makers.261 After publicly stating Turkey’s stance regarding the Soviet demands, 
foreign policy makers did not publicly discuss the matter further. According to 
Karabekir, the conviction that such a course could have undermined Turkey’s position 
vis-à-vis the Soviet Union was an influential reason for this policy.262 Yet, another 
reason was the profound belief that the situation was considered to be quite 
straightforward. The Soviet Union asked for concessions that would severely undermine 
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Turkish sovereignty and independence. Any discussion addressing how and why the 
Soviet Union was a security threat was ‘fruitless’. This conviction was most evident 
during the parliamentary discussions on the issue of the extension of the state of 
emergency in İstanbul and nearby cities. When some members of the Parliament asked 
the government to convene a closed session to further discuss the national security threat 
for extending the state of emergency, the answer was presented in a simplified manner 
as: “Even the children know what the threat to our national security threat is. Have you 
forgotten the [Soviet] demands for bases in the Straits?”263 
The (re)construction of the representation of the Soviet Union as a ‘prisoner 
to the imperialism of Tsarist Russia’ was reinforced by Turkish newspapers. Falih Rıfkı 
Atay, one of the most prominent columnists and also a member of the Parliament, 
blamed Soviet policy makers for abandoning the ‘sincere friendship’ built during the 
time of Lenin and the return to what he represented as ‘Tsarist policy’.264 Nadir Nadi, 
who was the leading columnist of Cumhuriyet, argued that the demands of the Soviet 
Union revealed that Moscow reverted to the Tsarist policy of expansion after 20 
years.265 Similarly, Cumhuriyet represented the Soviet demands on the Straits as the 
continuation of the Tsarist policy of expansion into the Mediterranean.266 The link 
between the Soviet Union and Tsarist Russia was completed by arguing that the ‘Moskof 
obsession’, hinting at the historical continuity with Tsarist Russia, with reaching the 
Mediterranean and occupying the Straits has always been revealed when Russia felt 
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itself strong enough. Furthermore, this ‘obsession’, it was argued, had been the major 
cause of numerous wars between Turkey and Russia.267 Correspondingly this ‘reversal’ 
to imperialism was the sole reason for the deterioration of Soviet-Turkish friendship 
after WWII.268 
The (re)construction of the representation of the Soviet Union as the 
successor of ‘Tsarist imperialism’ utilized readily available cultural and linguistic tools 
of the Turkish foreign policy discourse. Following the 1945 demands, the Soviet Union 
was represented in Turkish foreign policy discourse also as the follower of Nazi 
ideology (territorial imperialism) and tactics (coercion and oppression). Prime Minister 
Saracoğlu represented the territorial demands of Georgia as the interpretation of Hitler’s 
Lebensraum (living space).269 Such associations, although indirectly, were also implied 
during the parliamentary discussions. M. B. Pars, a member of the Parliament, stated his 
fear of the ‘revival of Hitler’s spirit’.270 
Turkish newspapers upheld this view and, further, argued that these demands 
were ‘strategic manipulations’ of the Soviets.271 Nadi reminded the readers that Hitler 
used to put forth ethnic, linguistic or historical arguments in order to mask his 
imperialist aspirations. 272 Nadi argued that the Soviet Union employed Hitler’s 
methods, however the former’s utilization of these methods was more likely to become 
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real.273 Similarly, it was argued in the pro-government Cumhuriyet that the Soviet Union 
possessing larger resources of population and land than Germany posed a greater danger 
to world peace.274 Thus, by utilizing the already available symbols and representations 
in the Turkish foreign policy discourse, the image of the Soviet Union was 
(re)constructed in the post-war period as not only a clear threat to Turkish sovereignty 
and independence, but also as a threat to world peace. It was emphasized that the Soviet 
policy had gone through significant change, while Turkish policy remained stable. And 
this change (to imperialism and Nazism) was represented as being solely responsible for 
the ‘crisis’ between Turkey and the Soviet Union. This representation clearly aimed to 
differentiate the Soviet Union of the time from the Soviet Union of the inter-war years, 
and represent the identity of the Soviet Union as a combination of Tsarist Russia and 
Nazi Germany. The next part will seek to show how this differentiation was 
strengthened through the (re)construction of the representation of the ‘West’ (especially 
the United States) in direct opposition to the Soviet Union and how the dichotomy 
between the constructed identities of the ‘West’ and the Soviet Union was represented 
as a necessity for ‘choosing’ between two separate worlds.  
 
 
3.3. Potsdam Conference and the internationalization of the ‘crisis’ 
 
The first signs of US interest in the Straits issue were seen during the Potsdam 
Conference. On 22 July 1945, as presented to Sarper beforehand on June 7, Molotov 
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proposed a new regime for the Straits based on joint-defense. Neither the United States 
nor Britain was not ready to accept such a proposal, and Churchill stated that this 
proposal went well beyond what was discussed before.275 Harry Truman had proposed 
the internationalization of the Straits (along with other in-land waterways), but this 
proposal was turned down by Stalin.276 Once it was understood that no decision could be 
reached, the ‘Big Three’ decided to leave the matter till later. It was decided that all 
parties would pursue the question through ‘direct conversations’ with Turkey.277 Yet, 
during a private conversation between Stalin and Churchill, Stalin asked whether the 
Soviet Union could be given a base at Dedeagatch (in Western Thrace) if it was not 
possible to provide bases located at the Straits.278 The issue of territorial demands was 
also addressed during the Conference. However, Stalin underlined that these demands 
were made because the Turkish government asked to conclude an alliance with the 
Soviet Union. Otherwise the Soviet Union would not have raised the issue.279 
Although the Potsdam Conference somewhat increased Western interest in 
the Straits issue, this was not accompanied by a clear backing of the Turkish arguments 
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– not yet in 1945.280 Erkin described Turkey’s ‘frustration’ in the following words: “we 
were left all alone against the Soviet threat.”281 Therefore, a significant pillar of Turkish 
policy should be ‘to look for, find, and if nonexistent to create’ the context to mount 
Western support.282 United States, in accordance with the Potsdam decision on the 
subject, was the first power to give a note to Turkey. The proposal, in general, suggested 
that the Straits should be closed to warships of non-Black Sea states, while the warships 
of Black Sea states should enjoy the right to navigate through the Straits at all times.283 
According to Mehmet Gönlübol and Haluk Ülman, prominent observers of Turkish 
foreign policy, this note was an indication of the change in US policy regarding the 
issue, since the United States, while leaving aside the former internationalization 
scheme, was abandoning the idea which had been most contrary to Turkish interests in 
the first place.284  
Yet, it should be noted that a regime providing the right of unrestricted 
passage through the Straits to Soviet warships and entirely denying the passage of other 
nations’ warships was also threatening to Turkey. Indeed as Erkin argued, it was not less 
threatening than the internationalization of the Straits (if the Soviet Union is represented 
as a threat).285 If such a regime was accepted, during the time of war when the Soviet 
Union is a belligerent and Turkey is neutral, the Soviet ships could have freely attacked 
any fleet in the Mediterranean or the Aegean and retire safely back to the Straits. And if 
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the ships attacked by the Soviet Union wanted to pursue the Soviet fleet, they had to be 
stopped by Turkish forces, as a result of which Turkey would probably be forced to join 
the war.286 How such a regime could be practiced during a time war in which Turkey 
and the Soviet Union were on different sides would be even more problematic.287 In 
fact, if the demand for bases was rejected for preventing Turkey’s obligatory 
‘dependence’ on the Soviet Union, such a regime would have ‘forced’ Turkey to a 
similar outcome. Not withstanding such problems, the Turkish government accepted 
United States’ proposal as a basis for discussions with certain reservations.288 
Although British interests in the area were far greater than US interests, as 
Howard argues it wouldn’t have been ‘strategic’ for Britain to firmly reject Soviet 
proposals, since Britain controlled both ends of the Mediterranean.289 Still, the British 
were in the Mediterranean, while the Soviets were not, and Britain wanted to keep 
things as they were.290 In other words, British policy was one of putting the issue off as 
long as they could. Yet, this should not be read as a clear support to Turkey. When 
Turkey, in February 1946, asked Britain to declare that the 1939 Alliance291 was still 
valid, British Foreign Office’s response was negative.292 Nevertheless, something Erkin 
represents as ‘very significant’ took place in mid-February 1946. The Soviet 
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Ambassador had a ‘very friendly’293 talk with Nurullah Sümer, acting Turkish Foreign 
Minister, at a party at the British Embassy. Such a talk was considered to be 
‘extraordinary’ given the nature of the Soviet-Turkish relations at the time. Erkin later 
represented this move as an acceptance, on the Soviet part, of the failure of coercive 
tactics, and noted that he was exceptionally relieved at the time.294 
Maybe it was with the help of the confidence boost provided by this event 
that Saracoğlu was able to tell the Soviet Ambassador in February 1946 that “you 
[Soviets] are fascists and Nazis.”295 This was an example of the (re)construction of the 
representation of the Soviet Union, in the Turkish foreign policy discourse, as the 
successor of Nazi Germany. It should be noted that clear support of the Western powers 
was not yet present. In other words, Turkish authorities were able to stand ‘firm’ against 
the Soviet Union without clear support from the Western powers. ‘Clear’ indications of 
Western support to Turkey started with Truman’s speech in the United States Congress 
on April 6, in which he stressed that if Turkey was attacked by another state, the United 
Nations, and if the U.N. fails, the United States would come to Turkey’s aid.296 On April 
15, the greatly hailed USS Missouri battleship arrived in Turkey.297 Ernest Bevin also 
                                                 
293 Erkin, Türk-Sovyet İlişkileri ve Boğazlar Meselesi, 280. 
294 Erkin, Türk-Sovyet İlişkileri ve Boğazlar Meselesi, 280-284. 
295 Bilge, Güç Komşuluk, 298. 
296 Howard, Turkey, the Straits and U.S. Policy, 241. 
297 Most of the sources attach great significance to the event, and interpret the event as a warning sign to 
the Soviet Union. Mensur Akgün and Turan Aydın, Türkiye-Rusya İlişkilerinde Yapısal Sorunlar ve 
Çözüm Önerileri (Istanbul: Tüsiad, 1999), 51; Ferenc A. Vali, Bridge Across the Bosporus: The Foreign 
Policy of Turkey (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1971), 173; George Harris, Troubled Alliance: 
Turkish-American Problems in Historical Perspective, 1945-1971 (Washington: American Enterprise 
Institute for Public Policy Research, 1972), 20; Gönlübol and Ülman, “Genel Durum,” 215; Aydın, 
“Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy,” 108.  
  85
declared on June 4 in the House of Commons that Britain would honor its obligations to 
Turkey under the 1939 Alliance in case of a threat to Turkish independence.298 
Yet, even before these ‘clear’ declarations of support, the ‘West’, especially 
the United States, had begun to be represented as the ‘defender of freedom’ in the 
Turkish foreign policy discourse. Saracoğlu praised the efforts of Britain and the United 
States during WWII in the Parliament, and declared that the United States was the 
“defender of freedom, justice, civilization and humanity in the world.”299 Similarly, 
Nadir Nadi argued that the United States and Britain strived for the “creation of a world 
system, in which all states enjoyed the rights of freedom and equality,” while the Soviet 
Union jeopardized other states’ security in the name of its own.300 ‘Obviously’ the 
Turkish cause and struggle (against the Soviet Union) was identified as a ‘struggle for 
rights and freedoms’ and was linked to the Western struggle.301 
Following the greatly praised USS Missouri’s ‘visit’ to İstanbul, the United 
States was further idolized as the ‘greatest’ defender of world peace and freedom.302 
Nihat Erim, a columnist in Ulus and a member of the Parliament, declared in the 
Parliament that the United States not only possessed the greatest military capability, but 
was also the leader of all nations in ‘ethics’ as a result of its struggle for the right of 
every nation to freely choose its type of government.303 Likewise, Prime Minister 
Saracoğlu maintained that Turkey could pay its debts to Washington only by “standing 
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side by side with the United States on issues regarding freedom, justice, independence 
and humanity.”304 
The Turkish newspapers were also influential in the construction of the 
identity of the United States as the ‘defender of world peace and freedom’. Atay 
represented the USS Missouri as the ‘symbol and messenger of peace and freedom’, 
while the United States was argued to be the defender of world security, and of ideals 
like freedom, equality and sovereignty.305 According to Turkish newspapers, the United 
States, the greatest power in the world, was using its power neither for expansionist 
and/or imperialistic aspirations nor for the forceful oppression of other states contrary to 
the Soviet Union. The mighty power of the United States served the ideals of freedom 
and justice; and was only used against those that stood for oppression and war wrote 
Turkish columnists.306  
Nihat Erim, also a member of the Parliament, declared in Ulus that the world 
was being divided into two: one part consisting of the Soviet Union and its satellites, 
while the other, which was lead by the United States, comprised ‘free’ states.307 The 
President of Turkey, İsmet İnönü, confirmed this divide and argued that it was no longer 
possible to follow a foreign policy pleasing all the great powers. Turkey had to ‘choose’ 
sides.308 But, in fact Turkey had already ‘chosen’ its side when the identities of the 
Soviet Union and the United States were (re)constructed in the dominant discourse of 
the policy makers. One as the ‘defender’ the other as the ‘enemy’ of world peace and 
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freedom. Turkey had ‘chosen’ its side when the Soviet Union was represented as a 
‘threat’ to Turkish independence and sovereignty. Yet, it was after the construction of 
the representation of the United States in direct opposition to the Soviet Union that 
Turkey’s ‘side’ became clear. The next section will aim to demonstrate the solidification 
of this ‘choice’. 
 
 
3.3.1. Soviet notes, Turkish replies 
 
One year after the Potsdam decision to continue ‘conversations’ with the Turkish 
government, the Soviet Union sent a note to Turkey on August 7, 1946. The note did not 
put forth any new demands (previous territorial demands were not mentioned). The 
Soviet proposal consisted of five points, the first three of which were the same as the US 
note. The other two points proposed joint defense of the Straits and called for bilateral 
negotiations for establishing a new regime by Turkey and the Soviet Union. The Soviet 
note emphasized that the ‘less-than-perfect’ implementation of the Montreux 
Convention throughout WWII demonstrated the inadequacy of the regime.309 The 
Turkish reply accepted the first three points, but the proposal for the joint defense of the 
Straits and bilateral negotiations for a new regime were rejected. Prime Minister Recep 
Peker explained at the Parliament that the last two points were infringing upon Turkish 
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‘independence’ and ‘sovereignty’, and accordingly were unacceptable.310 A detailed 
defense of Turkey’s record of the practice of the Montreux Convention was also 
included in the Turkish reply. The reasons behind the breaches pointed to by the Soviet 
Union were clarified.311 The Soviet note was a ‘relief’ to Turkish foreign policy makers, 
as they were expecting worse. This relief was clearly expressed by the Foreign Minister 
Hasan Saka.312 
The second Soviet note, presented on 24 September 1946, was milder in 
tone. Although repeating the demands and accusations of the first note, the idea of an 
international conference on the Straits was not ruled out by the Soviet Union.313 This 
was also acknowledged by some members of the Turkish government, who called for a 
negotiation with the Soviet Union. Britain also advised the Turkish government to 
negotiate with the Soviet Union.314 Yet, after some discussions on the issue, the idea of 
negotiations was rejected, and the Turkish reply was drafted as a defense of the 
Montreux regime, and Turkish ‘independence’ and ‘sovereignty’.315 The Soviet 
demands for joint defense were represented as the indication of Soviet ambitions for 
expansion. It was argued that the revisions accepted by Turkey and the Western 
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countries to the regulations of the passage of warships defined in the first three points 
should satisfy Soviet Union’s security in the Black Sea.316 The Soviet Union took no 
further steps after the Turkish reply and the ‘Straits crisis’ came to an end. 
The reaction of Turkish newspapers to the Soviet demand for bases 
positioned at the Straits was identical: yielding to Soviet demands for bases was the 
same as handing over the whole country. It was argued that if bases were to be given to 
the Soviets, Turkey would cease to exist as an independent country and would become a 
satellite of the Soviet Union.317 It was also argued that an independent and sovereign 
state should protect its territory by itself.318 These arguments represented the demands 
for bases as a ‘threat’ for not only Turkey, but for any ‘independent’ state. Yet, the issue 
was represented quite differently when it came to US ‘demands’ for bases in Europe and 
in the Far East. It was argued that the bases ‘requested’ by the United States were to be 
used for the protection of international security and peace. It was also argued by Abidin 
Dav’er, a prominent columnist of Cumhuriyet, that for a state, which has taken onto 
itself the protection of world security and peace, it was not only reasonable, but also 
necessary to request bases.319 The manner of in which the Soviet Union and the United 
States made ‘demands’ was also differentiated. While the United States, which was 
represented as having no aspirations for territorial expansion, sought to establish bases 
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with the consent of other states, the Soviet Union employed force and oppression to 
achieve its imperialistic ambitions.320  
 
 
3.4. Conclusion 
 
The major objective of Chapter 3 was to show how the Soviet Union was interpellated 
by Turkish foreign policy makers with a different identity than the ‘sincere friend’ 
identity (re)constructed throughout the inter-war years, and how this different identity 
enabled the construction of the representation of the Soviet Union as the successor of 
‘Tsarist imperialism’ and ‘Nazi Germany’ by Turkish foreign policy makers. 
Furthermore, the (re)construction of the representation of the Soviet Union as a 
‘prisoner to the imperialism of Tsarist Russia’ was reinforced by Turkish newspapers. 
The ‘imperialist’ Soviet Union and its ‘demands’ were represented by the Turkish 
foreign policy makers, and newspapers as an ‘obvious threat’ to Turkish ‘sovereignty’ 
and ‘independence’. The Chapter argued that the 1945-1946 ‘crisis’ between Turkey and 
the Soviet Union was not the inevitable product of the ‘Soviet demands’ for ‘unacceptable’ 
concessions. Rather, 1945 demands and the Soviet Union were represented as ‘threats’ to 
Turkish ‘sovereignty’ and ‘independence’ as a result of the (re)construction of the Soviet 
representation as an unfriendly power during and in the immediate aftermath of WWII. The 
Conclusion will focus on the practical and theoretical implications of the arguments 
presented in thesis. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
This thesis set off to provide an account of Turkish Foreign Policy towards the Soviet 
Union during the inter-war and post-war eras. This was attempted by employing a 
critical constructivist approach that seeks to illustrate the constructed character of the 
subject matter of IR. This has implications for the practice of international politics in the 
way that it opens up room for change through the demonstration of the arbitrariness of 
existing structures of ‘reality’ and ‘knowledge’. The arbitrariness of Turkey’s foreign 
policy towards the Soviet Union was demonstrated by looking at the radically different 
responses given by Turkish foreign policy makers to the contextually similar ‘demands’ 
of the Soviet Union. It was argued that the Soviet ‘demands’ throughout the inter-war 
years did not alter the ‘sincere friend’ identity of the Soviet Union, while similar 
‘demands’ in the post-war era entirely changed the identity of the Soviet Union to an 
‘enemy’. Whereas the ‘sincere friend’ identity allowed for maintaining good relations 
with the Soviet Union, the ‘enemy’ identity allowed the move towards the United States 
as opposed to the Soviet Union. 
The implications of this ‘move’ for practice maintained their significance in 
Turkish Foreign Policy. In 1946, Turkey had ‘resisted’ the Soviet demands arguing that 
  92
it did not need Soviet support for defending the Straits. Yet, interestingly the argument 
for closer relations with the United States was built on that very need for support in 
defending the Straits. There is nearly a consensus in the literature on Turkish Foreign 
Policy that the 1945-46 demands of the Soviet Union were the ‘major’ reasons behind 
Turkey ‘leaning’ towards the West.321 It is also argued that had the Soviet Union not 
insisted on the 1945 demands, Turkey would have continued its neutral policy.322 After 
the episode following the 1945 demands, Turkey sought to ‘enhance’ its security by 
joining Western institutions. When NATO was established in 1949, Turkish efforts were 
directed towards becoming a member. Bilge argues that Turkey tried to join NATO, 
because it was a weak country.323 Similarly, Erkin maintains that Turkey’s own 
capabilities were inadequate to defend the Straits in case of an attack. Thus, NATO had 
to support Turkey in a substantial way for the defense of the Straits.324 The Turkish 
argument, when the Soviet Union proposed a joint defense of the Straits, was based on 
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the sovereign rights of Turkey to protect its own territory by itself. Although the 
international context was altered substantially between 1945 and the early 1950s, the 
difference was constructed through the (re)representation of concepts like 
‘independence’ and ‘sovereignty’. 
One of the main roles of Turkey within NATO was ‘bottling up’ the Soviet 
navy in the Black Sea.325 Furthermore, the US need to obtain bases on Turkish territory 
was one of the key reasons in accepting Turkey to NATO in the first place.326 After 
Turkey became a member of NATO, crucial American (NATO) bases were established 
in İzmit (Karamürsel), İzmir (Çigli), Adana (İncirlik), Diyarbakır (Pirincilik). Relatively 
smaller bases were also established in Manisa, Afyon, Konya, İskenderun, Samsun, 
Trabzon, Erzurum and Ankara.327 Understanding how a country fiercely rejecting the 
idea of granting bases to another state could allow the establishment of more than ten 
bases on its territory demands more than a static conceptualization of ‘national interest’, 
along with awareness of the historical context. 
Representation of the country making a ‘demand’, awareness of the historical 
context and conjuncture are significant constituents in understanding the construction of 
the difference between a ‘threat’ and a ‘necessity’.  When United States was represented 
as the ‘defender of freedom and independence’ in the world, the acquisition of bases 
was represented as a ‘necessity’ for the United States to perform the ‘responsibilities’ of 
its role in the world. On the other hand, the representation of the Soviet Union as the 
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‘greatest enemy’ of world peace and freedom meant that its demands constituted a clear 
‘threat’. It should also be noted that the whole responsibility of the (re)construction of 
the Soviet representation or the Turkish policy that followed should not be solely placed 
on Turkey. The Soviet policy certainly played a large part, and this was also admitted by 
Nikita Khrushchev and Molotov later in 1953.328 Especially, the way in which the 
Soviet demands were presented to Turkey was ‘alarming’. Yet, the difference between 
the demands made between 1920 and 1939, and those made in 1945 was largely made 
sensible through the (re)construction of the representation of the Soviet Union. 
As a challenge to the realist accounts of Soviet-Turkish relations, and 
Turkish Foreign Policy in general, it was argued that critical constructivism provides a 
fuller account of this case. The major aim of this study was to present the processes 
through which Turkish Foreign Policy towards the Soviet Union was (re)constructed by 
Turkish foreign policy makers and how this enabled a different policy towards the 
Soviet Union in the post-war period. For this reason, the representations of the Soviet 
Union (re)constructed years later in the academic literature were omitted from the 
analysis. Yet, their uncritical repetition329 of the Soviet representation constructed 
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Scare of 1946 and its Consequences,” Diplomatic History 21:3 (Summer 1997): 414; Gürün, Dış İlişkiler 
ve Türk Politikası, 200. 
329 For the representation of the Soviet Union as the ‘successor’ of ‘Tsarist imperialism’, see Sezer, 
“Turkey’s Grand Strategy Facing a Dilemma,” 19; Haluk Ülman, “Sovyetler Birliği ve Türk Bogazları,” 
Forum 161 (15 December 1960): 6; Samuel Kucherov, “The Problem of Constantinople and the Straits,” 
Russian Review 8:3 (July 1949): 220; Cemil Bilsel, “The Turkish Straits in the Light of Recent Turkish-
Soviet Russian Correspondence,” The American Journal of International Law 41:4 (October 1947): 744; 
Necmeddin Sadak, “Turkey Faces the Soviets,” Foreign Affairs 27:3 (April 1949): 459; Ferenc A. Vali, 
Bridge Across the Bosporus: The Foreign Policy of Turkey (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1971), 211. 
For sources totally neglecting the inter-war years and representing a perpetual ‘Moskof’ threat, see Mark, 
“The War of Scare of 1946 and its Consequences,” 388; Tarihte Türk-Rus İlişkileri (Ankara: 
Genelkurmay, 1976), 120; Yahya Okçu, Türk-Rus Mücadelesi Tarihi (Ankara: Doğuş, 1953), 187-189. 
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throughout the ‘Straits crisis’ played a crucial part in the naturalization of the ‘enemy’ 
representation of the Soviet Union as ‘common sense’.  
All of the sources on the topic stress the importance of Turkish sovereignty 
and independence.330 Furthermore, they all agree that ‘Stalin’s demands’ posed a clear 
threat to Turkish sovereignty and independence.331 Yet, most of these sources, as the 
policy makers and newspapers of the 1945-46 period, do not consider any of the aspects 
of the Soviet-Turkish relations before WWII regarding the Straits, except the 1939 
negotiations for an alliance. It is not mentioned that the reason why a friendship 
agreement could not be reached with the Soviet Union in 1920 and why the negotiations 
broke down for seven months had to do with the Soviet ‘demands’ for Muş, Bitlis and 
Van. The Soviet ‘demands’ for the bilateral resolution of the Straits issue, accepted by 
Turkey in the 1921 Treaty332 and rejected during the negotiations of the 1925 Treaty, are 
not criticized. Similarly, Maxim Litvinov’s ‘demand’ for a base in the Straits during the 
negotiations of the Montreux Convention is not included as an example of the ‘insidious 
intentions’ of the Soviet Union. Erkin even praises the Soviet Union’s policy during the 
                                                 
330 It is interesting that the same sources do not mention these concepts, on which they seem to attach so 
much importance, while discussing US and NATO bases in Turkey or while discussing the role of NATO 
in the formation of Turkey’s defense policies. The chapter will return to this issue in the last part on the 
representation of NATO in Turkey. 
331 Haluk Ülman, “Dış Politikamızın Değişkenleri,” Yön (13 June 1962): 14; Mehmet Gönlübol and 
Haluk Ülman, “Genel Durum,” in Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası (1919-1973), eds. Mehmet Gönlübol and 
Cem Sar, 3rd ed. (Ankara: Sevinç Matbaası, 1974), 207; Nazmi Kal, İsmet İnönü: Televizyonda 
Anlattıklarım (Ankara: Bilgi, 1993), 79; “Dış Politikamız Üzerine,” 1; Erkin, Türk-Sovyet İlişkileri ve 
Boğazlar Meselesi, 256; Sadak, “Turkey Faces the Soviets,” 459; Sezer, “Turkey’s Grand Strategy Facing 
a Dilemma,” 19; Bilsel, “The Turkish Straits,” 743; Bağcı, “Türkiye’nin NATO Üyeliğini Hızlandıran İki 
Önemli Faktör,” 2; Helm, “Turkey and Her Defence Problems,” 436; Hale, “Turkey and the Cold War,” 
110. 
332 Cemil Bilsel argues that the clause regarding the bilateral resolution of the Straits issue of the 1921 
Treaty was not intended to reach at a solution only between Turkey and the Soviet Union. The Turkish 
intention was to guarantee the inclusion of the Soviet Union in an international conference on the Straits. 
See Cemil Bilsel, Türk Boğazları (Istanbul: İsmail Akgün Matbaası, 1948), 50-51. 
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Montreux convention, because the Soviet Union had ‘rejected all kinds of ambitions for 
expansion.’333  
Even the analyses of the commonly criticized 1939 demands for bases 
located at the Straits lacks the harsh tone used to represent the 1945-46 demands. The 
sources criticizing the 1939 negotiations334 describe the impact of the negotiations as 
resulting in a ‘cool off’ of Soviet-Turkish relations335, or as ‘hard knocks’336, or as ‘the 
breakdown of Soviet-Turkish closeness’.337 Açıkalın informs us that 1939 negotiations 
showed that Soviet policy ‘completely differed’ from that of Turkey’s, and thus no 
agreement could be reached. Yet, Cevat Açıkalın adds that the breakdown of the 
negotiations lead to dissatisfaction on the ‘Soviet part’.338 This portrait is certainly 
different from representing the 1945 demands as most ‘unjustified attacks’ against 
Turkish sovereignty and independence, and the Soviet Union as the greatest ‘enemy’ of 
world peace and freedom.  
How the representations of the academic literature contributed to the 
maintenance of a Turkish Foreign Policy throughout the Cold War depended on the 
‘Soviet threat’, and constitutes a crucial field of analysis for further study for critical 
approaches. However, this study, building on the contributions of the theoretical 
literature on critical constructivism, and critical theory in general, aimed to present a 
                                                 
333 Erkin, Türk-Sovyet İlişkileri ve Boğazlar Meselesi, 327. Similarly, Necmeddin Sadak argues that until 
1939, “nothing was left of Russian policy of expansion.” Sadak, “Turkey Faces the Soviets,” 450-452. 
334 For sources putting the emphasis on the Battle of Stalingrad rather than the 1939 negotiations, see A. 
Suat Bilge, “Kıbrıs Uyuşmazlığı ve Türkiye-Sovyetler Birliği Münasebetleri,” in Olaylarla Türk Dış 
Politikası (1919-1973), eds. Mehmet Gönlübol and Cem Sar, 3rd ed. (Ankara: Sevinç Matbaası, 1974), 
421;Erkin, Türk-Sovyet İlişkileri ve Boğazlar Meselesi, 341. 
335 Sezer, “Turkey’s Security Policies,” 11-12. 
336 Selim Deringil, “Aspects of Continuity in Turkish Foreign Policy: Abdülhamid II and İsmet İnönü,” 
International Journal of Turkish Studies 4:1 (Summer 1987): 42. 
337 Nur Bilge Criss, “Turkey’s Relations with the West (1908-1945),” in Fundamenta Turchiae, 
ed. Erik Zurcher (forthcoming), 31. 
338 Cevat Açıkalın, “Turkey’s International Relations,” International Affairs 23:4 (October 1947): 481. 
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critical constructivist account of Turkish Foreign Policy towards the Soviet Union in the 
inter-war and post-war eras. The thesis sought to achieve two more specific aims. The 
first aim was to present an analysis of the constitutive relationship between discourse, 
representations and identities, and foreign policy. The second aim was to open up room 
for change by presenting a critique of the dominant or hegemonic discourses of Turkish 
Foreign Policy and exposing the constructedness of the Turkish Foreign Policy 
discourse. In order to achieve these aims the thesis was presented in three Chapters.  
Chapter 1 argued that a ‘static’ and ‘fixed’ conceptualization of power and 
interest in accounting for foreign policy limits the explanatory value of realism for the 
Turkish case. It was further argued that by employing the critical constructivist approach 
this limitation is to a great extent made up for the gap. Chapter 2 argued that the Turkish 
foreign policy makers differentiated the representation of the Soviet Union from that of the 
Russian Empire in order to enable close relations with the Soviet Union. Close relations 
were maintained, through the ‘sincere friend’ representation of the Soviet Union, even when 
demands for the joint defense of the Straits were made by the Soviet Union. Chapter 3 
argued that the 1945-1946 ‘crisis’ between Turkey and the Soviet Union was not the 
inevitable product of the ‘Soviet demands’ for ‘unacceptable’ concessions. Rather, 1945 
demands and the Soviet Union were represented as ‘threats’ to Turkish ‘sovereignty’ and 
‘independence’ as a result of the (re)construction of the Soviet representation as an 
unfriendly power during and in the immediate aftermath of WWII.  
The implication of this thesis for the study of TFP is that critical approaches 
provide crucial insight for understanding the processes through which the Soviet Union 
was represented as the ‘enemy’ of Turkey in the post-war era by the Turkish foreign 
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policy makers, enabling Turkey’s decision to ally with NATO. For the study of foreign 
policy the conclusions of this thesis suggest that prominent realist accounts of foreign 
policy leave out significant processes through which foreign policy is formulated. On 
the other hand, an alternative approach to foreign policy, that of critical constructivism, 
offers a fuller account of foreign policy making by focusing on the mutually constitutive 
relationship between the construction of intersubjective meaning or discourse, and the 
identities and interests of agents. Instead of taking these constituents of foreign policy as 
exogenously given and fixed, critical constructivism questions how they were 
constructed in the first place. Further, critical constructivism traces the impact of these 
constructions on the formation of foreign policy. The study has significant implications 
for the practice of foreign policy making as well. By demonstrating that the ‘reality’ 
foreign policy makers act upon is a social construction critical constructivist approach 
provides the foreign policy makers with the possibility of alternative futures. Exposing 
the arbitrariness and constructedness of ‘reality’ suggests that realism’s anarchic world 
marked by self-help, rivalry, and violence is not the ‘natural’ product of history. Thus, 
critical constructivism suggests that ‘reality’ can be constructed in a different way. 
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